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THE UNEASY CASE FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY 
A. Mitchell Polinsky∗ and Steven Shavell∗∗ 
In this Article we compare the benefits of product liability to its costs and conclude that the 
case for product liability is weak for a wide range of products.  One benefit of product 
liability is that it can induce firms to improve product safety.  Even in the absence of 
product liability, however, firms would often be motivated by market forces to enhance 
product safety because their sales may fall if their products harm consumers.  Moreover, 
products must frequently conform to safety regulations.  Consequently, product liability might 
not exert a significant additional influence on product safety for many products — and 
empirical studies of several widely sold products lend support to this hypothesis.  A second 
benefit of product liability is that it can improve consumer purchase decisions by causing 
product prices to increase to reflect product risks.  But because of litigation costs and other 
factors, product liability may raise prices excessively and undesirably chill purchases.   A 
third benefit of product liability is that it compensates victims of product-related accidents 
for their losses.   Yet this benefit is only partial, for accident victims are frequently 
compensated by insurers for some or all of their losses.  Furthermore, the award of damages 
for pain and suffering tends to reduce the welfare of individuals because it effectively forces 
them to purchase insurance for a type of loss for which they ordinarily do not wish to be 
covered.  Opposing the benefits of product liability are its costs, which are great.  Notably, 
the transfer of a dollar to a victim of a product accident through the liability system requires 
more than a dollar on average in legal expenses.  Given the limited nature of the benefits and 
the high costs of product liability, we come to the judgment that its use is often unwarranted.  
This is especially likely for products for which market forces and regulation are relatively 
strong, which includes many widely sold products.  Our generally skeptical assessment of 
product liability for such products is in tension with the broad social endorsement of this 
form of liability. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The liability of manufacturers of products for harms caused to their 
customers — product liability1 — has great prominence in the United 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗ A. Mitchell Polinsky is the Josephine Scott Crocker Professor of Law and Economics at 
Stanford Law School.  Polinsky’s research on this Article was supported by the John M. Olin Pro-
gram in Law and Economics at Stanford Law School. 
  ∗∗ Steven Shavell is the Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard 
Law School.  Shavell’s research was supported by the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, 
and Business at Harvard Law School. 
   Both authors are also Research Associates of the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
The authors received helpful comments from Tom Baker, Richard Craswell, John Goldberg, 
Louis Kaplow, David Rosenberg, Jed Shugerman, Kathryn Spier, and Stephen Spurr, and grate-
fully acknowledge research assistance from many individuals, especially Anita Christy, Eric Hans-
ford, Patricia Judge, Jeffrey Kessler, Rakesh Kilaru, James Kwok, Peter Mandel, Joshua Minix, 
Joanna Nairn, Scott Noveck, Kevin Scott, Sherri Wolson, and Crystal Yang. 
  1  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TORTS:  PRODUCTS  LIABILITY §  1 ( 1998) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)] (“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the defect.”); id. § 1 cmt. c (“The rule stated in this Section applies . . . to 
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States.  Tens of thousands of product liability cases are filed annually 
in state and federal courts, including some as class or other mass tort 
actions that can involve thousands or even millions of individuals as 
plaintiffs.2  The legal bases for product liability suits are expansive, 
comprising liability for manufacturing defect, design defect, and fail-
ure to warn.3  Product liability cases receive significant attention from 
the media, especially when they concern widely sold products that 
harm many consumers.4  Moreover, product liability is of growing im-
portance outside of the United States, particularly in the European 
Union and in Asia.5 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
manufacturers and other commercial sellers and distributors  .  .  .  .”); see also R ESTATEMENT 
(SECOND)  OF  TORTS §  402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)].  See generally 
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW  OF TORTS § 352, at 969–72 (2000); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW § 1.1, at 1–10 (2005). 
  2  The most recent year for which relevant data are available is 2006.  In this year, 6454 prod-
uct liability cases were filed in the nine states studied by the National Center for State Courts.  
NAT’L  CTR.  FOR  STATE  COURTS,  EXAMINING  THE  WORK  OF  STATE  COURTS,  2007:  A 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 17 (Robert C. LaFoun-
tain et al. eds., 2008),  available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/ 
Examining%20Final%20-%202007%20-%201%20-%20Whole%20Doc.pdf (providing annual 
product liability caseload numbers from 1997 to 2006 in a spreadsheet that can be accessed by 
clicking on the “x” icon to the left of the phrase “Product Liability”).  Using population data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau to extrapolate from this number to the nation as a whole results in 29,163 
state product liability cases in 2006.  See U.S.  CENSUS  BUREAU, THE  2009  STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT 17 tbl.12 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/09statab/pop.pdf.  
In fiscal year 2006, there were also 49,743 product liability cases filed in federal district court. 
ADMIN.  OFFICE  OF  THE  U.S.  COURTS,  2007  ANNUAL  REPORT  OF  THE  DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS  OF  THE UNITED STATES COURTS 59 tbl.S-10 (2008).  Hence, the esti-
mated number of state and federal product liability cases in 2006 is 78,906.  For an example of a 
product liability class action involving a large number of individuals, see In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 
1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *41 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000), in which the court approved a 
settlement in favor of a class of approximately six million users of diet drugs.  See also 1 ALBA 
CONTE  &  HERBERT  NEWBERG,  NEWBERG  ON  CLASS  ACTIONS § 3:5, at 243–46 ( 4th ed. 
2002) (“Class actions under the amended Rule 23 have frequently involved classes numbering in 
the hundreds, or thousands, or even millions.” (footnotes omitted)).  Although the ability of plain-
tiffs to bring product liability suits as class actions has diminished in recent years, other means of 
aggregating cases are available to them.  See Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The 
Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883, 904 (2007) (“[A] review of federal product liability 
filings and MDL [Multidistrict Litigation] activity suggests that mass product liability litigation is 
still very much alive.”). 
  3  See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
  4  See infra section VII.C, pp. 1487–90. 
  5  See generally LOVELLS, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT 
FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  31 (2003) (“There has been a noticeable increase in the 
number of product liability claims in the EU in the last 10 years.”); id. at 37; OWEN, supra note 1, 
§ 1.4, at 49 (“[O]ver the last decade or two of the twentieth century, and the beginning years of the 
current century, modern products liability law and litigation has begun to spread its wings around 
the world.”); An Explanation of Japan’s Product Liability Law, 5 P AC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 299 
(Thomas Leo Madden trans., 1996) (describing a 1994 law that enhanced the Japanese product 
liability regime); Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twen-
ty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 756–60 (2003) 
(“[P]roduct liability has established itself in the vast majority of economically developed coun-
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Perhaps surprisingly, no one to our knowledge has attempted to ex-
amine the question whether, or in what circumstances, product liabili-
ty is socially desirable, considering its major benefits and costs.6  W e 
undertake this task here and come to the judgment that the case for 
product liability is problematic for a wide range of products.  The es-
sence of our argument is that the three beneficial effects of product 
liability — inducing firms to improve product safety, causing prices of 
products to reflect their risks, and providing compensation to injured 
consumers — are, for many products, likely to be outweighed by the 
litigation and related costs of product liability.7 
We discuss the influence of product liability on product safety in 
Part II of the Article.  To assess this effect, it is necessary to consider 
whether firms would have an incentive to make safe products even in 
the absence of product liability.  One reason that firms might have 
such an incentive concerns market forces, namely, that their sales may 
fall if their products harm consumers or are viewed as unduly risky, or 
that their sales may rise if their products are seen as particularly safe.  
We document this phenomenon with a number of examples involving 
widely sold products and describe more generally how consumers 
might learn about product risks.  A second reason that firms might 
take steps to enhance the safety of their products is that they may be 
subject to safety regulations.  Such regulations apply to a broad range  
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tries, . . . it is recognized as a special subject in many other parts of the world, and . . . there is a 
tendency for it to spread further. In short, it is fast becoming a global phenomenon.”  Id. at 757.); 
Craig S. Smith, Chinese Discover Product-Liability Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at B1 (“In 
the three years since China’s consumer-rights laws took effect, liability lawsuits have risen to 
more than half a million annually.”). 
  6  See infra section VII.B, pp. 1483–87. 
  7  Our benefit-cost evaluation of product liability follows in the tradition of the analysis of tort 
law from a social welfare–maximizing or instrumental perspective.  For a prominent early exam-
ple of this economic approach, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).  See 
also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).  As is con-
ventional in such analysis, we do not consider notions of fairness, on which individuals may place 
value and which thus should in principle be incorporated into social welfare.  See generally 
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).  As is also con-
ventional in economic analysis, we do not take the effects of legal policy on the distribution of 
income into account.  One reason is that redistribution of income may be difficult to accomplish 
through the law when, as here, the relevant parties are in a market relationship — notably, an 
attempt to redistribute income from manufacturers to consumers by imposing liability on manu-
facturers could be undone by price increases.  See generally Richard Craswell, Passing On the 
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
361 (1991).  In addition, it can be argued that legal rules should not be employed to redistribute 
income because the income tax and transfer system can better serve that purpose.  See generally 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).    
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of products, including pharmaceuticals, food, automobiles, and house-
hold appliances.  To the extent that market forces and regulation cause 
firms to make safe products, the potential for product liability to fur-
ther improve product safety is reduced.  We suggest that these factors 
are especially important for many widely sold products and therefore 
will often significantly lower the degree to which product liability adds 
to product safety.  Lending support to this judgment is that, for each 
of the several widely sold products that have been studied empirically, 
product liability fails to lead to a measurable increase in product   
safety. 
We address the second benefit of product liability, that it raises 
product prices and thus can usefully signal product risks to consumers, 
in Part III.  We explain that this price-signaling effect yields a benefit 
only to the extent that consumers misperceive product risks.  We also 
discuss complicating factors that may enhance or diminish the price-
signaling benefit. 
We evaluate the third benefit of product liability, that it compen-
sates victims for their injuries, in Part IV of the Article.  We emphasize 
there that product liability promotes the compensation goal only in-
crementally, because insurance coverage (including through public 
compensation programs)  is widespread.  In other words, individuals 
frequently would be compensated for some, and possibly all, of their 
product-related losses even in the absence of the product liability sys-
tem.  This is not to deny, of course, that many individuals do not have 
insurance or do not have sufficient coverage.  We also explain that 
product liability actually tends to work counter to the compensation 
goal because, by including damages for pain and suffering, it effective-
ly forces individuals to purchase insurance coverage for a category of 
losses for which they generally do not wish to be insured. 
In Part V we discuss the legal and related costs of the product lia-
bility system.  Studies of these costs demonstrate that for every dollar 
that victims of product accidents receive through the liability system, 
average legal expenses incurred by victims and injurers exceed a dol-
lar.  In addition to the direct legal expenses of the product liability sys-
tem, there are indirect costs generated by the effect of legal expenses 
on product prices.  Specifically, because firms must raise the prices of 
their products to cover their legal costs, consumers are undesirably 
discouraged from purchasing goods.8 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  8  Additionally, we explain that compensation for nonmonetary losses further discourages con-
sumption and results in consumer welfare losses.    
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  We come to the major conclusion of the Article in Part VI, that the 
case favoring product liability is weak for products for which market 
forces and regulation are strong, because the benefits of product liabil-
ity are then likely to be outweighed by its costs.  We suggest that this 
conclusion is most applicable in the domain where the use of product 
liability is most prominent — for widely sold products such as drugs 
and automobiles.  The main reason is that the influence of market 
forces and regulation on product safety tends to be significant for 
products that are widely sold, because problems with these products 
commonly attract the attention of consumers and regulators.  For 
products that are not widely sold, however, market forces and regula-
tion will usually be less effective and, as a consequence, product liabil-
ity is more likely to be socially advantageous.9 
In Part VII we discuss the contrast between our skeptical assess-
ment of product liability, at least for widely sold products, and the 
broad, though not universal, endorsement of product liability in judi-
cial opinions, academic writing, and the media.  The generally favora-
ble view of product liability held by others stems from the belief that 
such liability satisfies basic notions of fairness and yields significant 
product safety and compensation benefits.  But this judgment does not 
recognize that the benefits of product liability are incremental in na-
ture; only the enhancement to the level of product safety already gen-
erated by market forces and regulation should be counted, and only 
the addition to the level of compensation already yielded by insurance 
coverage should be included.  Furthermore, the proponents of product 
liability ordinarily ignore the high litigation costs that it engenders.   
The critics of product liability, too, make errors in assessing its benefits 
and costs. 
Finally, in Part VIII, we compare product liability to the liability of 
firms to strangers — that is, to individuals they injure who are not 
their customers.  Examples are fishermen harmed by an oil spill or 
homeowners injured by an explosion at a chemical factory.  Here mar-
ket forces do not operate to penalize firms for the harm that they gen-
erate because the victims of the harm are not their customers.  Accord-
ingly, the case for liability of firms to strangers is stronger than that for 
product liability. 
Our analysis in this Article is intended to alter the dominant view 
of the judiciary and of commentators that product liability has a clear  
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  9  The methodology that we employ to evaluate product liability could also be used to eval-
uate the liability of providers of services, such as physicians and accountants.  It does not matter 
to our logic that what is purchased is a service rather than a product.  The conclusions, of course, 
might be different.    
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justification on grounds of policy.  We believe, instead, that a more 
critical attitude toward product liability should be adopted.  This Ar-
ticle is not meant, however, to be an immediate call for judicial or leg-
islative change.  That would require a more detailed consideration of 
the benefits and costs of product liability than we can undertake here, 
as well as a careful examination of how legal doctrine could be useful-
ly modified.10 
Before proceeding, we also want to observe that our evaluation of 
product liability is not premised on a commonly encountered belief 
that juries and courts misapply the law or too liberally assess dam-
ages.11  Our analysis is consistent with the assumption that product 
liability law is applied in an unbiased manner and that damages are 
measured without systematic error.  We nonetheless conclude that the 
use of product liability is problematic in many circumstances because, 
even if correctly implemented, it might not generate social benefits that 
are worth its costs. 
II.  THE SAFETY BENEFIT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
In this Part we first discuss how market forces and regulation 
might reduce product risks.  We then investigate the safety benefit of 
product liability, that is, the extent to which it adds to the level of safe-
ty already generated by market forces and regulation.12 
A.  Incentives To Reduce Product Risk Generated by Market Forces 
Market forces can provide firms with an incentive to improve 
product safety, for if consumers believe that the risk of a product is 
high, they will either avoid buying the product or will not pay as much 
for it as they otherwise would.  For example, Tylenol’s market share  
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  10  See infra Part IX, pp. 1491–92. 
  11  See generally M ICHAEL  S.  GREVE,  HARM-LESS  LAWSUITS?  WHAT’S  WRONG  WITH 
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS (2005) (claiming that the current product liability system results in 
double recoveries and excessive deterrence); ERIC  HELLAND  &  ALEXANDER  TABARROK, 
JUDGE  AND  JURY:  AMERICAN  TORT  LAW  ON  TRIAL (2006) (maintaining that unwarranted 
awards are often given to plaintiffs, and that judges and juries frequently exhibit bias in making 
such awards); PETER  W.  HUBER,  LIABILITY:  THE  LEGAL  REVOLUTION  AND  ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (1988) (arguing that unduly high awards in product liability cases, and tort 
cases more generally, chill innovation and overdeter socially desirable behavior). 
  12  In other words, we consider the desirability of product liability against the background of 
the world as we find it, including the way in which market forces and regulation now operate.  
One could instead examine product liability against the background of an ideal world, in which, 
for example, market forces might be supplemented with additional government-provided informa-
tion about product risks and safety regulation might be more extensive.  Such an undertaking is 
beyond the scope of this Article.    
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fell from 35% to 5% following the deaths in 1982 of seven individuals 
who had ingested contaminated Tylenol capsules.13  Odwalla’s sales of 
natural juices declined by 90%14 in 1996 after one person died and six-
ty others were made ill by consuming some of its products containing 
E. coli bacteria.15  And Audi’s automobile sales dropped by 69% after 
reports in the mid-1980s of problems of sudden acceleration of its ve-
hicles.16  There are many other examples in which sales declined sig-
nificantly after consumers learned that a product was especially 
risky.17   
When, however, the harms at issue are not as salient as the ones 
just mentioned, market responses will tend to be weaker.  If the losses 
are low, occur infrequently, are difficult to trace to a product, even- 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  13  See Tamar Lewin, Tylenol Posts an Apparent Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1982, at 30 
(noting that Tylenol had a 35% market share before the deaths and quoting a company executive 
who said that “[w]e lost 87 percent of our market”).  After Johnson & Johnson switched to tam-
per-resistant packaging of its Tylenol product and instituted an extensive coupon campaign offer-
ing free Tylenol, Tylenol’s market share returned to 24%, still significantly below its earlier 35% 
market share.  Id. 
  14  See Brenda L. Moore, Time May Be Right To Take Bite of Odwalla, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 
1998, at CA1. 
  15  See Warren King, Another Toddler Treated for E. Coli, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 1996, at 
B3. 
  16  See Bradley A. Stertz, U.S. Study Blames Drivers for Sudden Acceleration, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 2, 1989, at B1 (“Within the past three years, fears that Audis were prone to sudden accelera-
tion cut U.S. sales of the models from an all-time high of 74,000 units in 1985 to just 22,943 last 
year.”).  While this article suggests that there might not have been a mechanical problem causing 
sudden acceleration of Audi automobiles, the pronounced reduction in the sales of Audis shows 
that consumer beliefs about the safety of a product can strongly influence demand for it. 
  17  See, e.g., RICHARD  N.L.  ANDREWS, MANAGING  THE  ENVIRONMENT,  MANAGING 
OURSELVES 213–14 (2d ed. 2006) (observing that sales of cranberries dropped by two-thirds after 
the discovery that some cranberries had been sprayed with a potentially toxic pesticide); GARY 
DAVIES  ET  AL.,  CORPORATE  REPUTATION  AND  COMPETITIVENESS  110–11 ( 2003) (noting 
that Perrier’s U.K. market share fell from 32% to 17% in the month following an announcement 
of benzene contamination); RONALD  D.  MICHMAN  &  EDWARD  M.  MAZZE,  THE  FOOD 
INDUSTRY WARS 140–41 (1998) (reporting that Gerber’s market share declined from 72% to 52% 
in 1986 after bits of glass were found in Gerber peaches in several states); Suresh Govindaraj, 
Bikki Jaggi & Beixin Lin, Market Overreaction to Product Recall Revisited — The Case of Fire-
stone Tires and the Ford Explorer, 23 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 31, 40 (2004) (observ-
ing that there was an “immediate drop of 50 percent . . . in the worldwide sales of Firestone tires” 
in the wake of their recall); Dealing with Low Turnover, TIME, Aug. 15, 1988, at 33 (reporting a 
63% decline in sales of the Suzuki Samurai after a Consumer Reports article claimed that it was 
unsafe to drive); Stephen Foley, Mattel Sales Hit by ‘Toxic Toy’ Recalls, INDEPENDENT (Lon-
don), Oct. 16, 2007, at 37 (noting that Mattel suffered a 19% decline in sales after a recall of lead-
tainted toys); Jack in the Box’s Worst Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at L35 (reporting that 
Jack in the Box’s sales dropped sharply after an E. coli outbreak was linked to its food products); 
Val Brickates Kennedy, Guidant Reports Lower Sales, Profit, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH, Jan. 
27, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/guidant-reports-lower-sales-profit-for-fourth-quarter 
(stating that sales of Guidant defibrillators fell 19% following product recalls).    
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tuate many years after a product is used, or are concealed, then the 
harms will be noticed less often by consumers.  Hence, in many cir-
cumstances firms might experience only a modest, or possibly no, de-
cline in sales as a result of selling products that injure consumers. 
While the demand for a firm’s product might decline in response to 
detrimental information about product risks, it is also possible that 
demand would rise in response to favorable safety information.  Volvo, 
for example, has been able to charge a premium for its automobiles, 
apparently because they have performed especially well in crash tests 
and have included safety features unavailable from other manufactur-
ers.18  Cirrus Design became the bestselling manufacturer of four-seat, 
single engine aircraft, in significant part because of its innovative pro-
vision of ballistic parachutes to lower its planes to safety in the event 
of loss of control.19  Sellers of bottled water are able to charge much 
more than the price of tap water20 because consumers perceive bottled 
water to be more pure.21 
The degree to which consumers will punish manufacturers for un-
safe products or reward them for safe products clearly depends on the 
information that consumers have about product safety,22 and they have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  18  See William Boulding & Devavrat Purohit, The Price of Safety, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 12, 
24 (1996) (finding that Volvo is able to charge one of the highest premiums for its cars); Chuck 
Squatriglia,  Volvo Promises an Injury-Proof Car by 2020, WIRED, May 2,  2008, http://www. 
wired.com/autopia/2008/05/volvo-promises (“Volvo’s long been at the forefront of vehicle safety.  
It invented three-point safety belts and was the first to use crumple zones, side-impact airbags 
and rear-facing child seats.  In a 2006 survey of 500 consumers conducted by Accenture, more 
than two-thirds of respondents ranked safety as the most important technology to include in their 
vehicles, 70 percent were willing to shell out extra for it.  Volvo’s long been the best at marketing 
safety, and a recent poll by Consumer Reports found 77 percent of respondents consider Volvo the 
safest car on the road.”). 
  19  Taking the Fear Out of Flying: Cirrus Sales Soaring to the Stratosphere, NODAK 
NEIGHBOR, Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 1, 4 (“The parachute innovation has Cirrus nipping at the tail 
wings of long-time industry leader Cessna.”); Austin Weber, Cirrus Soars with Composites, 
ASSEMBLY, Sept. 2008, at 26, 27 (noting that the Cirrus SR22 is the “world’s best-selling aircraft,” 
in part because of its reputation for being “safe and easy to fly” and in part because Cirrus “pio-
neered the unique concept of a plane with a parachute”). 
  20  More Consumers Turn on to Tap Water To Trim Costs, WALL ST. J., Jun. 18, 2008, at B5D 
(observing that a year’s worth of bottled water purchased from Costco would cost over $400, 
while the same amount of tap water would cost $0.51). 
  21  Branden B. Johnson, Comparing Bottled Water and Tap Water: Experiments in Risk Com-
munication, 13 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 69, 81 (2002) (finding that 43% of respondents 
thought that bottled water was safer than tap water, while only 3% of respondents thought the 
reverse).  It is possible that individuals’ perceptions of the safety of bottled water are exaggerated, 
but this example still supports the proposition that consumers’ willingness to pay for a product 
depends significantly on their views of its safety. 
  22  The more information consumers have about product risks, the better will be the market 
incentives acting on manufacturers to improve safety.  In principle, if consumers possessed perfect 
information, any risk-reducing precaution whose cost is less than its value would be taken by a 
manufacturer.  For instance, if consumers understand that a $25 safety guard for a chainsaw will 
reduce accident losses by $100, a manufacturer will include the safety guard with its chainsaws; 
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many sources of such information available to them.  In 2009, for ex-
ample, the top ten newspapers in the United States, with a total paid 
circulation of more than eight million people, published an estimated 
2,800 articles related to product safety.23  General news magazines, 
such as Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report, frequently include 
articles about product safety,24 as do numerous specialized magazines, 
such as Motor Trend and Guns & Ammo.25  Moreover, Consumer Re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
consumers will gladly pay an extra $25 for the guard because it will reduce their losses by more 
than that amount.  Of course, consumers are not perfectly informed in fact, so that market incen-
tives generally will lead to less than optimal safety. 
  23  The ten most widely read newspapers during the six month period ending on September 30, 
2009, had a total paid daily (Monday through Friday) circulation of 8.36 million.  In order of cir-
culation, they were The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The New York Times, The Los Angeles 
Times, The Washington Post, The New York Daily News, The New York Post, The Chicago Tri-
bune, The Houston Chronicle, and The Philadelphia Inquirer.  See Audit Bureau of Circulations, 
E-Circ Database, Newspapers, http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/newsform.asp (last visited Feb. 
27, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  A LexisNexis search of these newspa-
pers for the word “product” within five words of the words “safety,” “danger,” or “injure,” or the 
words “accident” or “defect” along with the words “injure,” “danger,” or “hurt” returned 1412 ar-
ticles published in the six month period between April 1, 2009, and September 30, 2009 (search 
last conducted Feb. 27, 2010). 
  24  A LexisNexis natural language search for the keywords “dangerous,” “consumer,” “product,” 
“safety,” and “injury” in Newsweek returned the maximum 100 articles for the calendar year 2008, 
including articles on the danger of cosmetics, baby bottles, and small cars.  See, e.g., Jac Chebato-
ris, For a Superhealthy Glow, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 2008, at 79 (discussing the safety of cosmetic 
products); Anna Kuchment, The Baby Bottle Blues, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 2008, at 53 (addressing 
the safety of baby bottles); Keith Naughton, Small.  It’s The New Big, NEWSWEEK.COM, Feb. 
16, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/112729 (citing safety concerns as the most important rea-
son that more small cars have not been sold).  A similar search in U.S. News & World Report also 
returned the maximum 100 responses, including articles on the safety of all-terrain vehicles 
(ATVs), sugar substitutes, and plastics.  See, e.g., Deborah Kotz et al., 12 Ways To Childproof Your 
Kids’ Summer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 2, 2007, at 59, 60–61 (reporting on children’s risk 
of injury as a result of operating ATVs); Adam Voiland, Here Comes the Controversial New Sugar 
Substitute Stevia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sep. 15, 2008, at 90 (highlighting safety concerns 
about a new sugar substitute); Adam Voiland, More Problems With Plastics, U.S.  NEWS  & 
WORLD REP., May 19, 2008, at 54 (discussing safety issues associated with human exposure to 
hormone-disrupting synthetic chemicals found in common consumer products, including vinyl 
tiles and shower curtains, processed food, cosmetics, and toys and baby products). 
  25  According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations, there are 33 specialized sports magazines 
(including  Climbing,  Surfing, and Ski Magazine),  32 fishing or hunting magazines (including 
American Hunter, Guns & Ammo, and Game & Fish Magazine), 37 automotive magazines (in-
cluding Motor Trend and Car and Driver), 10 boating or yachting magazines (including Boating), 
and 4 aviation magazines (including Flying) in regular circulation.  See Audit Bureau of Circula-
tions, E-Circ Database, Consumer Magazines, http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/magform.asp (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  These magazines frequently 
include items concerning product safety, product malfunctions, and recalls.  See, e.g., Bailout Bot-
tles, SCUBA  DIVING  MAG., Oct. 18,  2006, http://www.scubadiving.com/gear/2006/10/bailout-
bottles (rating several emergency air supply bottles for scuba divers); Bindings, SKI MAG., Sept. 
2005, http://www.skinet.com/ski/gear/2005/09/bindings (discussing safety features of ski bindings); 
Smith & Wesson Issues Product Safety Warning and Recall Notice, SHOOTING TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2006, http://www.shootingtimes.com/swpr_092206.    
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ports tests a broad range of products and evaluates their risks.26  The 
subscriber base of these magazines is approximately 45 million indi-
viduals.27  Daily television news programs report on major product de-
fects and accidents, and feature news programs, such as 60 Minutes 
and 20/20, often include segments on product problems.28  The com-
bined viewership of the three network evening news programs, Fox 
News, and CNN exceeds 25 million people,29 and that of 60 Minutes 
and 20/20 is about 18 million.30  The internet also allows consumers to  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  26  For instance, an electronic search of the print edition of Consumer Reports returned 154 ar-
ticles containing the word “safety” in the calendar year 2008, including articles on the safety of pet 
food, cooktop stoves, and vacuum cleaners.  See, e.g., Salmonella Taints Pet Food, CONSUMER 
REP., Dec. 2008, at 15 (noting the recall of dog and cat food due to salmonella contamination); 
Speedier Cooktops and Wall Ovens, CONSUMER REP., Dec. 2008, at 59 (discussing the safety fea-
tures of a Miele cooktop); Vacuums: Our Tests Show Several Standouts and Some Big Names To 
Skip, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2008, at 34, 35 (rating two vacuum cleaners as “Not Acceptable” 
because of safety hazards). 
  27  According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations, the total paid circulations for Newsweek, 
U.S. News & World Report, and Time during the six-month period ending December 31, 2009, 
were approximately 1.97 million, 1.19 million, and 3.33 million, respectively.  Motor Trend had a 
total paid circulation of approximately 1.14 million, while Guns & Ammo had a total paid circula-
tion of 413,239.  The total circulation for the special interest magazine categories identified supra 
note 25 was approximately 30.02 million.  See Audit Bureau of Circulations, E-Circ Database, 
Consumer Magazines, http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/magform.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) 
(on file with Harvard Law School Library).  Consumer Reports magazine, ConsumerReports.org, 
and the newsletters Consumer Reports on Health and Consumer Reports Money Adviser have 
combined subscriptions of more than 8 million.  See ConsumerReports.org, Our Mission, 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/overview/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2010).  Of course, there is some overlap among the subscribers of the magazines discussed in this 
note. 
  28  See, e.g., 20/20: After the Crash (ABC television broadcast July 16, 1999) (reporting on au-
tomobile gas tanks exploding due to design defects); 20/20: Toys in Trouble? (ABC television 
broadcast Nov. 13, 1998) (addressing the presence of the possibly harmful chemical phthalate in 
soft plastic toys); 60 Minutes: Is Your Car Safe? (CBS television broadcast June 11, 1978) (discuss-
ing problems with the Ford Pinto’s gas tank), cited in W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY AND SAFETY 841 (2d ed. 1989); 60 Minutes: Testing, Testing, Testing; Weapons Are 
the Only Manufactured Consumer Products Not Subject to Safety Inspections (CBS television 
broadcast Mar. 20, 1994) (covering handgun safety); CBS Evening News (CBS television broad-
cast Nov. 20,  2007) (addressing lead levels in popular toys, including Dora the Explorer and 
Spongebob Squarepants items). 
  29  In 2008, the viewership of the ABC evening news program averaged 8.1 million; that of 
CBS averaged 6.1 million; and that of NBC averaged 8.6 million.  Pew Project for Excellence in 
Journalism, The State of the News Media, http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/index.htm (follow 
“Network TV Audience” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).  The average primetime audience 
in 2008 of Fox News was 2.02 million and that of CNN was 1.05 million.  Id. (follow “Cable TV 
Audience” hyperlink). 
  30  In 2008, the audience of 60 Minutes averaged 11.9 million, and that of 20/20 averaged 6.1 
million.  Id. (follow “Network TV News Magazines” hyperlink).    
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easily locate evaluations of the safety of most widely sold products,31 
and many government agencies provide evaluations of product risks.32 
Obviously, consumers will only be exposed to a small fraction of 
this information due to constraints on their time.  Furthermore, indi-
viduals might not properly evaluate the information that they do have 
about product risks because they are subject to various cognitive bi-
ases.33  Hence, the availability of extensive information about product 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  31  One way to find information about the safety of a particular product is to search for it using 
Google.  For instance, a consumer can obtain data on the safety of the Toyota Tundra truck by 
entering the search terms, “safety toyota tundra 2008” into Google.  The results include the Insur-
ance Institute for Highway Safety’s test results for the Tundra.  See Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, 
Toyota Tundra, http://www.iihs.org/ratings/ratingsbyseries.aspx?id=444 (last visited Feb. 27, 
2010).  A Google search for “bike helmet safety” leads to, among other sites, the Bicycle Safety 
Helmet Institute, which provides ratings of bicycle helmets.  See Bicycle Helmet Safety Inst., 
http://www.helmets.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).  Another way to find product safety informa-
tion is to examine the web sites of organizations that address this topic.  See, e.g., Ctr. For Science 
in the Pub. Interest, http://www.cspinet.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (evaluating food safety); 
Consumeraffairs.com, http://www.consumeraffairs.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (supplying in-
formation about product recalls); Consumers Union, http://www.consumersunion.org (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2010) (assessing the safety of automobiles, household appliances, and many other prod-
ucts); Flight Safety Found., Aviation Safety Network, http://aviation-safety.net/database (last vi-
sited Feb. 27, 2010) (providing aircraft safety incident data, including by aircraft type); Ins. Inst. 
for Highway Safety, http://www.iihs.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (supplying crash test ratings 
for vehicles); W.A.T.C.H. World Against Toys Causing Harm, http://www.toysafety.org (last vi-
sited Feb. 27, 2010) (reporting on toy safety).  Other sources of safety information are websites of 
news outlets.  See, e.g., MOTOR TREND BUYER’S GUIDE, New Car Safety Ratings & Reports, 
http://www.motortrend.com/new_cars/safety_ratings/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (re-
porting vehicle safety and crash test ratings); NEW YORK TIMES, HEALTH NEWS, http://health. 
nytimes.com/pages/health (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (supplying health care news, including ar-
ticles on drug safety); WALL  STREET  JOURNAL, Auto Industry News, http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/page/news-autos-automotive.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (reviewing cars and motor-
cycles, including their safety).  Additional sources of safety information about products are the 
websites of specialty organizations and user groups.  See, e.g., Aircraft Owners & Pilots Assoc. Air 
Safety Found., Safety Highlights, http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/highlights.html (last vi-
sited Feb. 27, 2010) (providing aircraft reviews); CarGurus.com, http://www.cargurus.com (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2010) (evaluating new and used cars, including their safety); WebMD, Drugs & 
Medications A–Z, http://www.webmd.com/drugs/index-drugs.aspx? (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) 
(supplying safety information for over-the-counter and prescription drugs). 
  32  For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) furnish safety 
information to the public about a broad range of products.  See Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., http://www.safercar.gov (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (providing ratings of tire safety, crash 
test results, rollover ratings, and a database of recalls); U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 
CPSC Publications, http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/pub_idx.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) 
(offering safety assessments of numerous products, including bicycles, children’s furniture, and 
power equipment); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Medical Product Safety Information, 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Medwatch/SafetyInformation/default.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) 
(supplying safety information about drugs approved by the FDA, as well as a list of medical de-
vice recalls). 
  33  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics,  50 S TAN.  L.  REV. 1471, 1476–81 (1998) (discussing common cognitive biases); 
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 24–31 (1998) (same).  
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risks does not necessarily imply that consumers will be well-informed 
about these risks. 
Consumers should have a relatively good assessment, however, of 
the risks of many widely sold products.  A primary reason is that the 
media and regulators have naturally strong incentives to identify and 
publicize the risks of such products.  If there is a safety problem with a 
popular drug or an automobile, tens of thousands of individuals or 
more could be affected, which the media would be eager to report — 
as our examples of Tylenol and Audi automobiles illustrate34 — and 
which would probably attract the attention of regulators. 
The influence of market forces on product safety therefore is likely 
to be particularly important for widely sold products.  Moreover, firms 
that sell products in large volume have more to lose if consumers think 
that their products are dangerous and more to gain if consumers be-
lieve that their products are safe, giving them a greater incentive to 
invest in product safety.  Additionally, large firms tend to be especially 
concerned about their reputation for safety because they often offer 
multiple product lines and have long time horizons. 
Conversely, consumer knowledge about product risks should be less 
good for products that are not widely sold because media and regula-
tory interest in these products will be lower.  For instance, a problem 
with space heaters made by a local manufacturer and sold in limited 
volume would be unlikely to receive more than brief mention by the 
media or to be noticed by regulators.  Hence, market forces usually 
will be less effective for products that are not widely sold and the 
companies that sell these products will tend to have weaker incentives 
to increase their safety. 
The preceding observations about products that are, and are not, 
widely sold only describe central tendencies.  It could be that consum-
ers do not have good information about the risks of a widely sold 
product, especially if, as we noted above, the harm the product causes 
is small or infrequent, is difficult to attribute to its source, or occurs 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahne-
man, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).  When individuals misperceive risks, they some-
times underestimate and sometimes overestimate them.  See, e.g., Sarah Lichtenstein et al., 
Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 551 (1978) (reporting that 
individuals systematically overestimate the frequency of death from unlikely events and underes-
timate the frequency of death from likely causes); Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lich-
tenstein, Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 181, 
193 tbl.3 (Richard C. Schwing & Walter A. Albers, Jr. eds., 1980) (finding that individuals accu-
rately predicted the number of annual fatalities due to home appliances, underestimated those due 
to X-rays, and overestimated the danger of vaccinations); Michael S. Wogalter, Douglas J. Brems 
& Elaine G. Martin, Risk Perception of Common Consumer Products: Judgments of Accident Fre-
quency and Precautionary Intent, 24 J. SAFETY RES. 97, 100 (1993) (reporting that individuals 
overestimate low-probability product risks and underestimate high-probability product risks). 
  34  See supra notes 13 and 16.    
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many years after the product’s use.  Thus, market forces might not in-
duce the manufacturer of a widely sold product to improve its safety.  
It could also be the case that consumers do have good information 
about a product that is not widely sold.  The customers of a neighbor-
hood restaurant, for instance, might be expected to learn about a fre-
quent problem of food poisoning there by word of mouth.  Thus, mar-
ket forces could lead a seller of a product that is sold to a limited 
number of individuals to take care to reduce the risk of harm. 
B.  Regulation of Product Risk 
In addition to market forces, government regulation affects the 
safety of a broad range of products,35 and we now briefly describe sev-
eral areas of regulation. 
Automobiles.  Automobile safety regulations are extensive in nature 
and include, for example, requirements regarding seatbelts, crashwor-
thiness, fuel tank construction, and windshield and tire strength.36  
These requirements are primarily enforced by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),37 whose annual budget ex-
ceeds $856 million.38  Firms are subject to sanctions for violating au-
tomobile safety regulations39 and their executives are potentially sub-
ject to criminal liability.40 
Pharmaceuticals.  Pharmaceutical products must satisfy rigorous 
testing and labeling requirements that are overseen by the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).41  The FDA’s Center for Drug Eval-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  35  See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 96–119 (1982); CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2002); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & 
JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 789–826 (4th ed. 2005). 
  36  See ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 34 tbl.3-2 (1986); 
Murray Weidenbaum, Regulation of the Automobile: Extensive and Growing, EXECUTIVE 
SPEECHES, Dec. 1998–Jan. 1999, at 14.  On the specific requirements mentioned in the text, see 
49 C.F.R. § 571.109 (2008) for regulations on tire strength, endurance, and dimensions; 
§§ 571.201–.224 for regulations on crashworthiness, including seat belt and windshield mounting 
requirements; and §§ 571.301–.304 for regulations on fuel system integrity and fire prevention. 
  37  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 322, 30111 (2006) (granting Secretary of Transportation power to prescribe 
motor vehicle safety standards); 49 C.F.R. § 1.50 (delegating authority to NHTSA Administrator); 
see also 49 U.S.C. § 30166 (granting Secretary of Transportation authority to conduct inspections 
and investigations as necessary to enforce motor vehicle safety regulations).  For a detailed ac-
count of the development of NHTSA, see JERRY  L.  MASHAW  &  DAVID  L.  HARFST,  THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
  38  DEP’T  OF  TRANSP., FISCAL  YEAR  2010 B UDGET  HIGHLIGHTS  18 (2009), 
http://www.dot.gov/budget/2010/bib2010.pdf. 
  39  49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (authorizing financial penalties of up to $5000 per violation). 
  40  Id. § 30170(a) (authorizing an imprisonment sentence of up to fifteen years for falsifying or 
withholding information relating to motor vehicle safety violations that cause death or serious 
bodily injury). 
  41  See FDA  REGULATORY  AFFAIRS:  A  GUIDE  FOR  PRESCRIPTION  DRUGS,  MEDICAL 
DEVICES,  AND  BIOLOGICS (Douglas J. Pisano & David Mantus eds., 2004); SUZANNE 
PARISIAN,  FDA:  INSIDE  AND  OUT ( 2001); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Legislation, 
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uation and Research has a staff of approximately 3000 employees and 
an annual budget of about $760 million.42  New pharmaceuticals gen-
erally are subject to four phases of clinical trials to ensure that they  
are safe and effective.43  Prescription drugs must satisfy FDA labeling 
requirements and include information about their proper use.44   
Significant violations of FDA drug regulations are subject to fines and 
imprisonment.45 
Aircraft.  Stringent aircraft safety standards, set by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), govern the manufacture,46 mainten-
ance,47 and airworthiness48 of all aircraft.  Every accident involving a 
civil aircraft is investigated at the initiative of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB).49  Violations of aircraft regulations may 
result in seizure of noncompliant aircraft, civil penalties, and criminal 
sanctions.50 
Consumer products.  Safety standards apply to numerous consumer 
products, such as toys, cigarette lighters, baby cribs, and household 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); see 
also ARTHUR A. DAEMMRICH, PHARMACOPOLITICS: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND GERMANY (2004). 
  42  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 77 
(2009),  available at  http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/Budget 
Reports/ucm153374.htm. 
  43  See BERT SPILKER, GUIDE TO CLINICAL TRIALS xxii–xxiii (1991); Nat’l Insts. of Health, 
Understanding Clinical Trials, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2010); see also Brian Vastag, New Clinical Trials Policy at FDA, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
1043, 1043 (2006). 
  44  See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601 
(2009)) (reviewing and amending FDA regulations governing labeling requirements for prescrip-
tion drug products). 
  45  21 U.S.C. § 333(b) (2006) (authorizing maximum fines ranging from $250,000 to $1,000,000 
and imprisonment for up to ten years). 
  46  See 14 C.F.R. § 21.6 (2009) (requiring manufacturers of aircraft, aircraft engines, or propel-
lers to obtain a special “type certificate”); id. §§ 21.121–.165 (requiring manufacturers operating 
under type or production certificates to set up inspection, quality control, and testing systems). 
  47  See id. §§ 43.1–.17 (requiring detailed inspection and maintenance records and that inspec-
tion and maintenance operations be performed by FAA-certified mechanics, repairmen, or air car-
rier operators). 
  48  See id. §§ 23.1–39.27 (setting out detailed airworthiness requirements, including provisions 
for structure, weight distribution, speed, performance, roll and stability, force and torque limits, 
mechanics, and control systems); see also Fed. Aviation Admin., Airworthiness Directives, 
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/Frameset?OpenPage 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (collecting airworthiness directives requiring special provisions for par-
ticular aircraft and parts). 
  49  49 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring NTSB to investigate each accident involving civil 
aircraft); Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., History and Mission, http://www.ntsb.gov/Abt_NTSB/ 
history.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (noting NTSB’s mission to investigate all U.S. civil avia-
tion accidents). 
  50  See 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.13–.29 (providing various enforcement measures for violations of FAA 
regulations).    
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chemicals.  These standards are developed and enforced by the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), which was created “to   
protect the public against unreasonable risks of injuries associated 
with consumer products.”51  In addition to imposing civil fines for vi-
olations,52 the CPSC has the authority to order the recall of unsafe 
products.53 
Regulations of the type just noted have beneficially affected the 
safety of many products.  For example, automobile safety standards 
have been determined to have significantly reduced the number of 
deaths due to collisions.54  Similarly, FAA safety requirements have 
been found to have played an important role in lowering general avia-
tion aircraft accidents.55  There is evidence that regulation has reduced 
risk in other areas as well.56 
Safety regulation is likely to be more effective for widely sold prod-
ucts, such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and aircraft, than for 
products whose distribution is limited.  One reason is that regulators 
will be more concerned about the risks of products sold in high vol-
ume, as mentioned in the previous section, and thus will tend to invest 
substantial effort in regulating them.  A second reason is that regula-
tors will obtain more information about a product’s hazards if many 
members of the public are using the product and then reporting prob-
lems after suffering from its defects. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  51  Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 2(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1207, 1208 (1972) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1)  (2006)) (establishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission).   
For a list of more than 15,000 consumer products regulated by the CPSC, see U.S. Consumer 
Prod. Safety Comm’n, Regulated Products, http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/reg1.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2010). 
  52  15 U.S.C. § 2069 (providing for civil penalties). 
  53  Id. § 2071 (providing for injunctive enforcement and seizure upon action brought by the 
Commission). 
  54  See, e.g., CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 36, at 51, 55–68 (conducting statistical analysis in 
order to estimate the influence of automobile safety regulation and finding “a very large effect of 
the improved safety design of automobiles since 1966 upon occupant death rates,” id. at 66); John 
D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE 120, 182–83 
(Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (finding NHTSA regulation to be a main factor 
contributing to a decrease in motor vehicle fatalities); Lloyd D. Orr, The Effectiveness of Automo-
bile Safety Regulation: Evidence from the FARS Data, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1384, 1387 (1984) 
(analyzing data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System for the years 1975 through 1978 and 
concluding that as many as 9,200 lives were saved by new automobile regulations). 
  55  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENERAL AVIATION 8–9, 56–61 (2001) (reviewing 
numerous FAA initiatives that improve general aviation safety); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Assoc., 
Learn To Fly: Is It Safe?, http://flighttraining.aopa.org/learntofly/safe/index.html (last visited Feb. 
27, 2010) (reviewing various factors, including FAA regulations, contributing to the decline in the 
accident rate per flying hour since 1950). 
  56  See  U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Success Stories Index, http://www.cpsc.gov/ 
cpscpub/pubs/success/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (describing the safety benefits of regu-
lations concerning, for example, cigarette lighters, cribs, hair dryers, and bicycles).    
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Of course, regulation will be far from perfect due to the limited 
knowledge of regulators, their budgetary constraints, and the possibili-
ty that they may be captured by the firms that they are responsible for 
overseeing.57  Consistent with these observations, some studies have 
found regulation to be ineffective or of limited value in certain con-
texts.58  Our point is not that regulation will serve as a general cure for 
product safety problems, but rather that it contributes in a significant 
way to reducing many product risks. 
C.  Risk Reduction Accomplished by Product Liability 
Product liability is applied through three primary doctrines.59  Un-
der the design defect doctrine, a firm can be held liable for accidents 
caused by its product if the design of the product was defective, mean-
ing, essentially, that a different design could have been employed that 
was safer and not excessively costly.60  Under the manufacturing defect 
doctrine, a firm can be held liable for an accident if the particular unit 
that caused the accident was not manufactured according to the in-
tended design.61  Under the failure to warn doctrine, a firm can be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  57  See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Richard A. Posner, Theories of 
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (reviewing versions of capture 
theory); Robert D. Tollison, Regulation and Interest Groups, in REGULATION 59 (Jack High ed., 
1991). 
  58  See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 12–14 (1993) (discussing the limited efficacy of asbestos cleanup regulation); 
W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regulation, 28 J.L. & 
ECON. 527, 531 (1985) (“The impact of current CPSC regulations is likely to be quite small, and 
even if the agency were much more active than it now is, it is doubtful whether there would be a 
dramatic impact on product safety.  The absence of any stark shift in product safety after the ad-
vent of the CPSC is borne out by the accident trend data . . . .”). 
  59  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2; DOBBS, supra note 1, § 355, at 
910–17; OWEN, supra note 1, §§ 1.3, 7.1–9.6, at 23–48, 432–620. 
  60  Design defect occurs when “the manufacturer’s design specifications . . . themselves create 
unreasonable risks. . . . [T]he test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at a reasona-
ble cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the 
omission of the alternative design . . . rendered the product not reasonably safe.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 398 (manu-
facturer is liable “for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adop-
tion of a safe plan or design”).  “[A] design defect occurs when the intended design of the product 
line itself is inadequate and needlessly dangerous.”  DOBBS, supra note 1, § 355, at 980.  Because 
design defect cases concern an entire product line, if a defect is found, then “every unit in the 
same product line is potentially defective” and the manufacturer is liable for harms caused by all 
products in the line.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 1 cmt. a. 
  61  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 395 (“A manufacturer who fails to exercise 
reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel . . . is subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to [those who are injured] by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is sup-
plied.”).  The Restatement (Third) defines a manufacturing defect as “a depart[ure] from [the 
product’s] intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2(a).  A manufacturing de-
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held liable if it failed to provide a reasonable warning about the riski-
ness of the product.62 
Even though product liability might lower a product risk in the ab-
sence of market forces and regulation, it will turn out to be superfluous 
if a desirable safety precaution has already been taken because of these 
two factors.  Consider, for example, electronic stability control in au-
tomobiles, a feature that can reduce the risk of skidding and rollovers.  
Market pressures could lead to adoption of this feature if consumers 
appreciate its value, or a regulator might require it.  Hence, product 
liability might not be necessary to induce automobile manufacturers to 
adopt electronic stability control — and, apparently, market forces 
have played a role in stimulating this improvement.63 
It may happen, of course, that neither market forces nor regulation 
results in a beneficial reduction of risk for the reasons that we dis-
cussed in sections A and B.  Then, product liability may be efficacious.  
Consider a shield on a lawnmower that could prevent stones from be-
ing ejected by its cutting blades.  Market forces would not induce 
manufacturers to employ the shield if consumers do not understand its 
benefits, and regulators might not require the shield for similar rea-
sons.  But the prospect of being found liable for a defectively designed 
lawnmower might induce manufacturers to include the shield.64 
Another reason that product liability could be effective is indi-
rect — that product liability litigation may result in publicity about 
product problems and thereby enhance market forces and spur regula-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
fect is a “flaw in the manufacturing process, resulting in a product that differs from the manufac-
turer’s intended result.”  Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1988).  Unlike a design 
defect, a manufacturing defect “is a random failing or imperfection.”  DOBBS, supra note 1, § 355, 
at 979.  Common examples include “products that are physically flawed, damaged, or incorrectly 
assembled.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c. 
  62  A product is deemed “defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provi-
sion of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor . . . and the omission 
of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 1, § 2(c); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 388 (holding 
manufacturers liable for “fail[ing] to exercise reasonable care to inform [those for whose use   
the chattel is supplied] of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be   
dangerous”). 
  63  See Joseph B. White, Car-Accident Deaths Fell in ’08, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at D8 
(“More recently, auto makers have been going beyond what the law requires, because that is what 
consumers are demanding.  The increasing use of stability controls and antirollover systems is an 
example.  Electronic stability controls will be mandated on new vehicles by 2012, but many new 
vehicles have this technology today.”). 
  64  Yet product liability will not necessarily be successful in taking up the slack left by market 
forces and regulation.  Notably, in a product liability lawsuit a court might not recognize a safety 
precaution that is in fact cost-effective, such as the shield for lawnmowers.  This possibility is 
plausible because the factor that would often lead the market and regulators to fail to recognize 
the value of a safety precaution — lack of information about its risk-reducing effects — might 
also lead a court to fail to recognize its value.    
2010]  PRODUCT LIABILITY  1455 
tion.  If adverse reactions to a drug would not come to the attention of 
the media or regulators unless product liability suits were brought, 
then product liability could be responsible for lower sales of the drug 
and regulatory action to remedy its dangers. 
The degree to which product liability reduces product risk is there-
fore an empirical question, which we now address.  In an early and 
widely cited study, Professor George Priest examined accident statistics 
during the 1970s and 1980s, a period when the scope of product liabili-
ty law grew substantially and the volume of product liability litigation 
increased greatly.  However, he found no discernible effect of the en-
hanced product liability activity on accident rates.65  A significant   
qualification concerning the interpretation of his finding, however, 
stems from the fact that the accident rates he considered were for gen-
eral categories of accidents, and that the accidents were not necessarily 
product-related.  Hence, a small decline in product-related accident 
rates might not have been revealed by his data.66  But a large decline 
would have had a measurable effect unless product-related accidents 
were a small fraction of all accidents;67 we therefore find the Priest 
study suggestive. 
Several studies of the effect of product liability in particular indus-
tries, which we summarize below, also examine whether product liabil-
ity affected accident rates during the period when the volume of prod-
uct liability litigation increased in a marked way.  These studies 
conclude that product liability has had no noticeable impact on acci-
dent rates and thus tend to confirm Priest’s findings. 
General aviation aircraft.68  In separate investigations, Andrew 
Craig and Robert Martin assessed the influence of product liability on 
the safety of general aviation aircraft.69  They observed that the liabil-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  65  See George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate,  in L IABILITY: 
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 187–94 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). 
  66  This qualification of Priest’s study was made by DON  DEWEES,  DAVID  DUFF  & 
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 203, 205 (1996). 
  67  Dewees and his coauthors observe that “either accidents caused by defective products are a 
small percentage of all product-related accidents or the tort system has not significantly reduced 
defective product-related accidents, or both.”  Id. at 203. 
  68  General aviation aircraft are aircraft with a maximum seating capacity of fewer than twenty 
passengers that are not engaged in regularly scheduled airline operations.  General Aviation Revi-
talization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(c), 108 Stat. 1552, 1553 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40101 (2006)).  There were 231,607 such aircraft in active use in 2007.  GEN. AVIATION MFRS. 
ASS’N,  2008  GENERAL  AVIATION  STATISTICAL  DATABOOK  &  INDUSTRY  OUTLOOK  28 
(2008),  available at http://www.gama.aero/files/2008_general_aviation_statistical_databook_ 
indust_499b0dc37b.pdf.  In 2008, general aviation aircraft accounted for approximately 44% of all 
aviation fatalities in the United States.  See Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Aviation Accident Statistics, 
at tbl.1, http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/stats.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
  69  Andrew Craig, Product Liability and Safety in General Aviation,  in T HE  LIABILITY 
MAZE,  supra note 54, at 456; Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry 
Under Siege, in THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 54, at 478.    
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ity and defense expenditures of manufacturers of these aircraft rose 
sharply from the 1970s to the 1980s, growing approximately nine-
fold.70  However, the rate of fatal accidents did not display a decline 
that could be linked to the sharp increase in liability.  The accident 
rate had been falling for many years, and in the years during and fol-
lowing the increase in liability the accident rate did not decline more 
steeply; it actually fell less steeply.71  Craig and Martin both concluded 
that heightened liability apparently did not reduce general aviation 
aircraft fatalities.72 
One reason that product liability might not be expected to affect 
the safety of general aviation aircraft very much is obvious — pur-
chasers of aircraft have a pronounced incentive to obtain information 
about the safety records of the planes they will be flying.  Hence, mar-
ket forces are likely to play a significant role in inducing aircraft man-
ufacturers to provide safe airplanes.  A second reason that product lia-
bility might result in little improvement to the safety of aircraft is that 
FAA regulation is extensive, as mentioned above. 
Motor vehicles.  Professor John Graham employed regression anal-
ysis to determine whether product liability reduced motor vehicle fa-
talities during the period 1950–1988.73  He found essentially no effect 
and concluded that if there is a beneficial influence of product liability 
on motor vehicle accidents, it is too small to be detected using aggre-
gate data.74 
Graham also undertook five case studies of specific safety problems 
in motor vehicles.  The studies concerned defects related to the fuel 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  70  Martin, supra note 69, at 484–85 (reporting that the aviation industry’s costs for defending 
against and paying product liability claims rose from $24 million in 1976 to $210 million in 1986); 
see also Craig, supra note 69, at 457 (observing that liability costs per fatality rose from about 
$17,000 in 1977 to about $223,600 in 1985). 
  71  Martin used regression analysis to estimate the trend in fatal accident rates for general avia-
tion from 1950–1969, when aircraft manufacturers were not subject to strict liability, and from 
1970–1989, when a strict liability regime was in place.  See Martin, supra note 69, at 494 fig.13-1.  
He observed that “[Figure 13-1] displays a sharp downward trend for the twenty years that were 
free of the influence of strict liability, in contrast to a significantly flatter downward trend in the 
accident rate over the twenty years after the intervention of strict liability and the litigation it has 
spawned.”  Id. at 493; see also Craig, supra note 69, at 457–58. 
  72  Craig, supra note 69, at 457 (“Clearly, therefore, the aggregate accident and liability cost 
data do not support the view that liability litigation has enhanced safety in this industry.”); Mar-
tin, supra note 69, at 493 (“These data indicate that strict liability has demonstrated no tendency 
to promote the safety of flight . . . .”); see also Randy A. Nelson & James N. Drews, Strict Product 
Liability and Safety: Evidence from the General Aviation Market, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 425, 436 
(2008) (finding that strict product liability actually increased the accident rate of general aviation 
aircraft because it depressed sales of new planes and led individuals to fly older and more danger-
ous planes). 
  73  Graham, supra note 54, at 183, 186–87. 
  74  To be precise, Graham found that higher liability was positively associated with a higher 
accident rate, but the effect was not statistically significant.  Id. at 182–83.    
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tank of the Ford Pinto,75 transmissions in Ford vehicles,76 the roll bar 
of the Jeep CJ,77 airbags and seat belts,78 and all-terrain vehicles.79  
Graham found that when safety problems arose, manufacturers re-
sponded primarily because of a concern about their reputations with 
consumers and because of pressure from regulators.80  For example, 
after fuel tank explosions in the Ford Pinto were widely publicized, 
Ford voluntarily altered its fuel tank design and also made changes in 
response to increased regulatory requirements of the NHTSA.81  Sig-
nificantly, Graham found that in all of the case studies product liability 
was not necessary for the stimulation of the specific safety improve-
ments that were adopted.82  He noted, however, that product liability 
might have been sufficient to induce certain safety improvements or at 
least to have hastened them,83 especially because the adverse publicity 
accompanying litigation can spur market forces.84 
Childhood vaccines.  Richard Manning studied the effect of prod-
uct liability on the diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine.85  
He found that the liability risk borne by manufacturers of DPT in-
creased dramatically from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.  Notably, 
the number of suits filed against such manufacturers in the first three 
years of the data, 1978–1980, averaged two per year, whereas in the 
last three years of this data, 1985–1987, the average number of suits 
was 217.86  The safety of the DPT vaccine did not, however, change 
during this period.87 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  75  Id. at 128–37. 
  76  Id. at 137–44. 
  77  Id. at 144–55. 
  78  Id. at 155–68. 
  79  Id. at 168–80. 
  80  See id. at 135–37, 155, 163–64, 166, 178–80. 
  81  Pinto-related injuries generated significant media attention and negative publicity for Ford.  
Id. at 132, 136.  After learning about the Pinto problems, the NHTSA opened a formal investiga-
tion, id. at 132–34, and in 1977 it instituted stricter fuel tank standards, id. at 136.  Ford also vol-
untarily modified the fuel tanks of pre-1977 Pintos not covered by the new requirements.  It did 
so even though, at the time, such behavior might have been seen as an admission of guilt and 
could have led to greater liability, suggesting that its safety improvements were motivated by fac-
tors other than the threat of tort liability.  Id. at 135–36. 
  82  Id. at 180 (“In no case did we conclude that liability considerations were necessary to stimu-
late a specific safety improvement.  In other words, other factors would eventually have led to the 
safety improvement.”); id. at 181 tbl.4-3. 
  83  Id. at 181 tbl.4-3 (identifying instances in which liability was a “sufficient condition” or a 
“contributory factor” for a safety improvement).  
  84  Id. at 180–82. 
  85  Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines, 
37 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1994). 
  86  Id. at 258, 259 tbl.3. 
  87  Id. at 259 (“[T]he DPT vaccine currently in use in this country is essentially the same today 
as it has been for many years.”).    
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The preceding synopsis of empirical evidence concerning the effect 
of product liability on accident rates covers the main statistical studies 
of which we are aware.88  No others are mentioned in three reviews of 
empirical research on the safety benefit of product liability.89 
Although the empirical evidence that we have summarized is com-
prised of a limited literature and is subject to criticism,90 we believe 
that one may reasonably conclude the following from it.  First, the in-
fluence of product liability on product safety is likely to have been at 
most small for the three industries studied, general aviation aircraft, 
automobiles, and childhood vaccines.  Otherwise the investigators pre-
sumably would have found a measurable effect of product liability on 
product safety during the period when product liability litigation in-
creased dramatically.  Second, the findings of these industry studies 
support the prediction that the safety benefit of product liability for 
many other widely sold products — those for which market forces and 
regulation have similar importance — will be small.  However, market 
forces and regulation may be more significant for general aviation air-
craft, automobiles, and childhood vaccines than for the average widely 
sold product, implying that the safety benefit of product liability may 
be lower for these industries than more generally.  In any case, when 
we combine the foregoing conclusions with the points made in sections 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  88  Two other statistical studies are Richard S. Higgins, Producers’ Liability and Product-
Related Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1978); and Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort 
Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007).  Higgins’s results do not have a clear 
meaning; he finds that product liability increases the home accident fatality rate in states with 
high levels of education but reduces it in states with low levels of education.  See Higgins, supra, 
at 320. Rubin and Shepherd’s results support the view that product liability does not enhance 
safety; they find that product liability increases accidental deaths by raising the prices of safety-
enhancing goods and services and thereby reducing their use.  See Rubin & Shepherd, supra, at 
222. 
  89  See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 66, at 202–03, 205; Mark A. Geistfeld, 
Products Liability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS § 11.11, at 301–04 (Michael Faure ed., 2d 
ed. 2009); Daniel P . Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, 
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 343, 363 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007).  Two of these surveys also discuss some studies of reports by executives about their 
responses to product liability.  See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 66, at 197–98; 
Geistfeld, supra, at 303.  We do not consider these studies because they do not examine how prod-
uct liability affects actual accident rates. 
  90  Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock question the import of the Priest study for the reasons ob-
served on p. 1455, though they conclude that “[a]ggregated empirical analysis . . . suggests that 
increased product liability has not led to any decrease in product-related accidents.”  DEWEES, 
DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 66, at 205.  Geistfeld makes critical comments about the stu-
dies that he reviews, including Priest, supra note 65; Graham, supra note 54; Higgins, supra note 
88; and Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 88; but he does not discuss the industry studies of Craig, 
supra note 69; Martin, supra note 69; and Manning, supra note 85.  See Geistfeld, supra note 89, 
§ 11.11, at 301–04.  Kessler and Rubinfeld, after discussing Priest and Martin, observe that “this 
work is only suggestive, since many other determinants of the accident rate (such as regulatory 
policy) may have been changing contemporaneously with aggregate trends in products liability 
pressure.”  Kessler & Rubinfeld, supra note 89, at 363.    
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A and B about the contribution of market forces and regulation to 
product safety, we come to the opinion that a skeptical attitude about 
the effect of product liability on product safety for widely sold prod-
ucts is warranted.91 
III.  THE PRICE-SIGNALING BENEFIT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
Product liability affects consumer well-being not only through its 
influence on product safety, but also through its impact on product 
prices.  Specifically, because product liability causes prices to rise to re-
flect product risks, it may beneficially discourage consumers from buy-
ing risky products.  As noted in the Introduction, we refer to this effect 
as the price-signaling benefit of product liability (we consider a related 
price distortion cost in Part V). 
A.  Price-Signaling and Consumer Information 
To explain the price-signaling benefit more precisely, we begin with 
a fundamental proposition of economics that social welfare is max-
imized if consumers buy a product when and only when its value to 
them exceeds its costs.  Suppose that a consumer places a $15 value on 
having a widget, that the widget costs $10 to produce, and that it 
causes $1 of harm on average to its owner.  Then social welfare will be 
raised if the consumer buys the widget because her value of $15 ex-
ceeds the widget’s total cost of $11, comprised of both the direct pro-
duction costs and the harm the widget causes.  Conversely, if a con-
sumer attaches only a $9 value to the widget, social welfare will be 
lowered if the consumer buys it.  Ideally, every consumer who values a 
widget more highly than $11 will buy one, and every consumer who 
values a widget less highly will not. 
If consumers have good information about product risks, they will 
make the socially correct purchase decisions even in the absence of 
product liability.  In the example, a widget will have a price of $10 in a 
regime without product liability because firms will bear only their 
production costs.  Yet if consumers know about the harmfulness of 
widgets, they will realize that they also will incur $1 of losses per wid-
get, so they will regard the effective price of a widget as $11.  Conse-
quently, consumers will buy widgets if and only if the value they place 
on them exceeds $11, which is the socially ideal outcome. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  91  Whereas in this section we have considered the effect of product liability on accident rates, 
others have examined the influence of product liability on innovation, liability insurance pre-
miums, product prices, product availability, and international competitiveness.  See  DEWEES, 
DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 66, at 197–205; Kessler & Rubinfeld, supra note 89, at 363; 
Robert E. Litan, The Safety and Innovation Effects of U.S. Liability Law: The Evidence, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 59 (1991).    
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Suppose, however, that consumers underestimate product risks.   
Assume that they believe that the harm caused by a widget is $0.75 in-
stead of the true value of $1.  Without product liability, the price of 
widgets will be $10, as we just noted, but if consumers mistakenly be-
lieve that the harm they will bear per widget is $0.75, the effective 
price of a widget will be only $10.75.  As a result, a consumer might 
buy a widget when doing so is socially undesirable.  For instance, a 
person for whom the value of a widget is $10.85 will buy one even 
though its true cost is $11; her purchase will result in a net loss to her 
of $0.15. 
If consumers underestimate the harm from products, the imposition 
of liability on manufacturers will improve consumer purchases by rais-
ing product prices.  In other words, there will be a price-signaling ben-
efit from product liability.  The widget price will rise to $11 as a result 
of liability, because manufacturers will incur not only $10 in produc-
tion costs per widget, but also $1 in liability costs (to compensate con-
sumers for their $1 loss).  Hence, with product liability, consumers will 
buy a widget only if they place a value on it that exceeds $11, the so-
cially desired outcome. 
The magnitude of this price-signaling benefit of product liability 
depends on the degree of consumer underestimation of product risks.  
In the example, consumers were assumed to underestimate the $1 
harm by $0.25.  If instead they underestimate the harm by, say, $0.75, 
the price-signaling benefit will be greater. 
Product liability also can correct for consumer misperceptions if 
consumers overestimate product risks.  In that case they will buy too 
little of a product in the absence of product liability.  Suppose that 
they incorrectly believe that widgets cause $1.50 of harm instead of $1.  
They will therefore regard the price of a widget as $11.50  
instead of $11 and buy too few widgets.  With product liability, how-
ever, the price of a widget will be $11 and consumers will again pur-
chase widgets only if they value them more highly than $11, the de-
sired outcome. 
In sum, by causing the prices of products to properly reflect acci-
dent risks, product liability will lead consumers to purchase the social-
ly ideal quantities of risky products.92  This price-signaling benefit oc-
curs regardless of whether consumers underestimate or overestimate 
product risk.  But the magnitude of the benefit depends on the degree 
of consumers’ misperception, with the benefit being smaller the better 
informed are consumers. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  92  See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12–17, 20–22 
(1980); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 
REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).    
2010]  PRODUCT LIABILITY  1461 
The analysis in this section presumed for simplicity that the price 
increase due to product liability reflected only the manufacturer’s ex-
pected liability payments.  More realistically, however, the price in-
crease also will reflect litigation costs.  We discuss these costs and their 
detrimental implication for price-signaling in Part V. 
B.  Price-Signaling and First-Party Insurance 
In the preceding section we did not consider first-party accident in-
surance, but it is relevant to the decisions of consumers whether to 
purchase risky products.93  If a consumer has insurance with full cov-
erage, then she knows that if she buys a product and it causes harm, 
her insurer will compensate her for her losses — she will thus ignore 
the possibility of product-caused harm in her purchase decision.  It fol-
lows that she will buy an excessive quantity of risky products in the 
absence of product liability. 
In the earlier example, the price of a widget was $10 in the absence 
of liability, and we explained that a consumer who was knowledgeable 
about the product risk would add $1 to this price to account for the 
risk.  Hence, she would buy a widget only if it were worth at least $11 
to her.  But if she has insurance, she will treat the price of a widget as 
only $10 because her insurer would cover her losses, and thus she 
might buy a widget even when its value to her is less than its full cost 
of $11, a socially undesirable outcome.94 
The problem of excessive purchases of risky products due to first-
party insurance can be remedied by employing product liability, a 
point that has been emphasized by Professors Jon Hanson and Kyle 
Logue.95  As noted above, if product liability is imposed on manufac-
turers, the prices of products will rise to reflect expected accident 
losses, leading consumers to make desirable purchase decisions.  A 
consumer will have to pay $11 for a widget, not $10, and thus will buy 
a widget only if she values it at least this much, which is the socially 
correct outcome.96 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  93  In order to isolate the effects of first-party accident insurance, we assume in this section that 
consumers have perfect information about product risks.  More realistically, of course, the effects 
of consumer misperceptions and first-party insurance will operate simultaneously. 
  94  The distortion of purchase decisions due to first-party accident insurance was first thor-
oughly analyzed by Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An 
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 159–68 (1990). 
  95  Id. at 171. 
  96  This statement presumes that consumers do not collect the $1 of liability payments under 
product liability.  That could be the case if these payments are obtained by consumers’ first-party 
insurers under subrogation arrangements (which we discuss in section IV.B).  If subrogation   
were not applicable, then the effective price of the product would be too low, even with product 
liability.    
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A qualification to the foregoing analysis is that the insurance dis-
tortion applies only to monetary losses because nonmonetary losses are 
not generally covered by first-party insurance policies.97  This point is 
significant because approximately half of all tort awards are for non-
monetary losses.98  Suppose in the widget example that half of the $1 
accident loss is attributable to nonmonetary harm.  Then in the ab-
sence of product liability, the effective price of a widget would be 
$10.50 because the consumer would bear the $0.50 nonmonetary por-
tion of her loss that is not covered by insurance.  Only the remaining 
$0.50 monetary portion of her loss would be ignored because of first-
party insurance.  Hence, there is a much smaller problem for product 
liability to correct. 
IV.  THE COMPENSATION BENEFIT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
As we observed in the Introduction, the influence of product liabili-
ty on compensation is incremental, only beyond that furnished by in-
surance.  We begin, therefore, with a summary of the extent of insur-
ance coverage. 
A.  Compensation Accomplished by Insurance 
A substantial majority of Americans have some private or public 
insurance coverage for medical expenses, disability, loss of life, and 
property damage that might result from accidents, including product-
related ones.  A few statistics indicate the contours of individuals’ in-
surance coverage.  Approximately 85% of the population possesses 
health insurance,99 about 78% of U.S. families own life insurance,100 at 
least one-third of the workforce holds some form of disability cover-
age,101 and 96% of homeowners have property insurance.102  Addition-
ally, individuals benefit from an implicit form of public insurance 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  97  See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
  98  See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002 UPDATE 17 fig. (2002) (in-
dicating that awards for noneconomic losses slightly exceed those for economic losses). 
  99  See C ARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. 
CENSUS  BUREAU,  INCOME,  POVERTY,  AND  HEALTH  INSURANCE  COVERAGE  IN  THE 
UNITED STATES: 2007, at 21 fig.7 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-
235.pdf (showing that 15.3% of the population has no health insurance).  The 85% figure is prob-
ably an underestimate of the true percentage of the population that has health insurance.  Id. at 
59–60. 
  100  See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK: 2008, at 61 (2008) 
(citing 2004 data). 
  101  See B UREAU  OF  LABOR  STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP’T  OF  LABOR,  NATIONAL  COMPEN-
SATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2008, Civilian In-
dustry Tables, tbl.12 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2008/ebbl0041.pdf. 
  102  See Ins. Info. Inst., Homeowners Insurance: Expenditures for Homeowners and Renters 
Insurance, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/homeowners (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (cit-
ing 2006 data).  Additionally, 43% of renters had renters insurance.  Id.    
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against accidents, namely, the deductibility of casualty losses (losses 
due to a sudden event) and medical expenses from taxable income.103  
Such deductions function as insurance because they reduce the loss 
that a person suffers from an accident.104 
Although most Americans hold major forms of insurance coverage, 
a significant minority lack coverage, and the level of coverage of those 
who have insurance may be substantially less than their losses.  Thus, 
product liability still has a potentially important role to play in provid-
ing compensation for product-related accident losses. 
B.  Compensation Accomplished by Product Liability 
To assess the extent to which product liability adds to the compen-
sation that individuals obtain from insurance, we first discuss subroga-
tion provisions in insurance contracts.  As we explain, these provisions 
lower the compensation that individuals receive from product liability 
settlements or judgments.  We then address two other factors — legal 
fees and delay — that also reduce the compensation that individuals 
derive from the product liability system. 
Subrogation provisions in insurance contracts.  Insurance contracts 
commonly include subrogation provisions that give the insurer the 
right to sue the injurer on behalf of the victim.  The insurer may then 
keep some or all of any judgment or settlement, up to the amount it 
has already paid to the insured.105  Subrogation rights in property and 
casualty insurance policies are established by common law in most   
jurisdictions, and these policies usually include express subrogation 
clauses as well.106  Subrogation rights in health and medical policies 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  103  Casualty losses can be deducted to the extent that they exceed 10% of adjusted gross in-
come.  See 26 U.S.C. § 165(h)(2) (2006).  Unreimbursed medical expenses can be deducted to the 
extent that they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income.  See id. § 213(a). 
  104  For example, if a person incurs a $100,000 loss but obtains a tax benefit worth $25,000 due 
to the deductibility of the loss, it is as if the person were covered by a $25,000 insurance policy.  
See Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deduc-
tions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485 (1991). 
  105  Subrogation is explained by Allan D. Windt: 
[T]he [insurance] company is ordinarily entitled, on making a payment to or on behalf of 
the insured  .  .  .  to step into the shoes of the insured and assert any cause of action 
against a third party that the insured could have asserted for his or her own benefit had 
the insured not been compensated by the insurer. . . . Moreover, the insurer should be 
entitled to sue only for an amount of money necessary to make it whole. . . . The insurer 
should not . . . be able to recover for damages incurred by the insured in excess of the 
amount that the insured was paid by the insurer. 
ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 10:5, at 10–24 (5th ed. 2007) (footnotes omitted).  See generally 
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 391–407 (2003). 
  106  See K ENNETH  S.  ABRAHAM,  INSURANCE  LAW  AND  REGULATION  244–45 ( 4th ed. 
2005); Alan O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383, 383–84 (2001).    
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are also widespread and are generally established by explicit terms in 
insurance contracts.107 
The following examples illustrate how an insurer can obtain some 
or all of a victim’s judgment or settlement as a result of subrogation.  
Suppose that an individual suffers a $100,000 loss for which she is ful-
ly compensated by her insurer, and the defendant settles the claim for 
$75,000.  Then, due to subrogation, the insurer can keep the entire 
$75,000 settlement.  If, however, the victim’s insurance coverage is less 
than her loss, the situation is more complicated.  Suppose now that her 
insurance policy compensates her for only $60,000 of the $100,000 loss.  
Then, if there is a $75,000 settlement, one possibility is that she will 
receive $40,000 of the settlement, thereby making her whole, and her 
insurer will retain the balance of $35,000.108  Another possibility is that 
the insurer will keep $60,000 of the settlement, so that it will be fully 
reimbursed for its payment to the insured, with the remaining $15,000 
going to the insured.  A third possibility is that the settlement will be 
shared between the insured and the insurance company in a way that 
makes neither of them whole.109  In sum, subrogation often results in 
accident victims receiving only a fraction of their settlements or judg-
ments,110 and possibly nothing at all.111 
Legal fees.  The payment of legal fees also substantially reduces the 
net compensation that a victim of a product accident obtains from a 
settlement or judgment.  The great majority of product liability suits 
are brought under contingency fee arrangements,112 in which the legal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  107  See ABRAHAM, supra note 106, at 405; Sykes, supra note 106, at 383–84. 
  108  This outcome — that the victim is made whole before the insurer retains any part of a set-
tlement or judgment — is the most common of the three possibilities that we discuss.  See 
ABRAHAM, supra note 106, at 405–07; Sykes, supra note 106, at 385. 
  109  We have discussed the possible outcomes when the settlement, $75,000, is between the in-
surance coverage of $60,000 and the loss of $100,000.  Another situation arises when the settle-
ment is less than the insurance coverage of $60,000 — say it is $50,000.  Then there are three pos-
sibilities analogous to those mentioned in the text.  Specifically, the plaintiff may receive $40,000 
of the settlement, making her whole, and the insurer will receive the remaining $10,000; the insur-
er may receive the entire $50,000 settlement, making it as whole as possible; or the plaintiff and 
the insurer may share the settlement in some intermediate way. 
  110  An exception occurs in the following circumstances.  Suppose that a settlement is low, such 
that the sum of the settlement and the victim’s insurance coverage is less than the victim’s loss.  
Then if the principle that the victim should be made whole before the insurer obtains any part of 
a settlement or judgment is applicable, the entire settlement would be retained by the victim. 
  111  Subrogation does benefit individuals indirectly through lower insurance premiums (because 
subrogation provides insurers with additional revenue).  But lower insurance premiums do not 
result in an increase in compensation in the event of an accident. 
  112  According to Deborah Hensler et al., 87% of tort liability claimants who retained an attor-
ney entered into a contingency fee arrangement to cover legal fees.  DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET 
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED  STATES  135–36 & tbl.5.11 ( 1991),  available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
reports/2006/R3999.pdf.  We assume that the percentage for product liability suits is not signifi-
cantly different.    
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fees of individual plaintiffs typically equal 25% to 33% of the amount 
received.113  The legal fees of class plaintiffs average approximately 
18% of the value of settlements or awards.114 
Delay.  Delay in the payment of judgments or settlements also low-
ers the effective compensation of victims of product accidents, for two 
reasons.  First, if victims do not receive interest on their judgment or 
settlement from the time of the accident until receipt of their payment, 
then they will be shortchanged.  This issue is relevant because sub-
stantial delay in receiving compensation is typical — the time between 
injury and payment in tort suits often is measured in years115 — and 
prejudgment interest sometimes is not awarded.116  Second, if victims 
cannot easily borrow against possible future judgments or settlements, 
as will often be true, then they may suffer because of illiquidity while 
waiting for payment. 
C.  The Social Desirability of the Compensation  
Accomplished by Product Liability 
Although, for the reasons we have just discussed, the amount of 
additional compensation that individuals actually receive due to the 
product liability system will usually be significantly less than the 
amount defendants pay in settlements or judgments, it will still, of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  113  See id. at 136 (finding that the median fixed contingency fee paid is 33% and that the me-
dian adjusted contingency fee paid is between 25% and 33%); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, The 
Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 D EPAUL  L.  REV. 267, 286 
(1998) (observing that the contingency fee paid in the vast majority of fixed contingency fee ar-
rangements is 33% and that the contingency fee paid in adjusted contingency fee arrangements is 
usually 25% if the case does not involve substantial trial preparation and 33% if it does). 
  114  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An 
Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 51 tbl.1 (2004) (finding that the mean fee 
rate for tort class action lawsuits is 17.9%). 
  115  In a study of 1452 closed malpractice claims from five liability insurers, the average time 
between the injury and the closure of the claim was five years.  See David M. Studdert et al., 
Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2024, 2026 (2006), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/354/19/2024.  For 
tort suits in general, claims take an average of 21 months to process if there is a bench trial, and 
26.5 months if there is a jury trial. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 8 tbl.9 (rev. Apr. 9, 
2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. 
  116  See, e.g., 4 MATTHEW BENDER, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 39.01 (2009) (“[M]any 
states continue to limit interest in [wrongful death and personal injury actions] to post-judgment 
interest . . . .”); Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 297 
(1996) (“[T]he requirement that a losing defendant pay prejudgment interest to a successful plain-
tiff remains far from universal.”).  Some states have begun to reform their laws to permit recovery 
of prejudgment interest.  See Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, Prejudgment Interest Reform, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7492 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (cataloging state 
reform efforts).    
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course, often be positive and sometimes be substantial.  We now con-
sider the value to individuals of this additional compensation.117 
Our first point is that the value of the compensation that an acci-
dent victim obtains due to product liability will be relatively low when 
she also receives insurance payments.  The reason is that her insurance 
payments will be used to satisfy her most pressing financial needs (say, 
for payment of medical expenses).  The money she obtains through the 
product liability system will be used to meet her remaining and less 
important needs.  Hence, the benefit per dollar received due to product 
liability payments will be lower.118 
To illustrate, suppose that an individual with assets of $200,000 
faces a one percent chance of a $100,000 loss, that she has insurance 
coverage that would compensate her for $60,000 of the loss, and that 
the product liability system would compensate her for the remaining 
$40,000.119  Using economists’ statistical estimates of individuals’ de-
gree of risk aversion, we calculate that she would obtain a benefit 
equivalent to $1480.52 from the insurance coverage and an additional 
benefit of $499.12 from the supplemental compensation provided 
through product liability.120  Thus, the benefit per dollar of compensa-
tion due to product liability is $0.0125 (= $499.12/40,000), which is only 
approximately half of the benefit per dollar of insurance coverage, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  117  Individuals will have to pay for compensation provided through the product liability system 
in the form of higher product prices, and they will benefit indirectly from this compensation in the 
form of lower first-party insurance premiums (as a result of subrogation).  Therefore, the net val-
ue to individuals of compensation due to product liability equals the direct value of the compensa-
tion to them, less the increase in product prices, plus the reduction in first-party insurance pre-
miums.  It is the net value of compensation that enters into the benefit-cost calculus.  (Because we 
examine litigation costs in Part V, we do not consider price increases due to litigation costs here.) 
  118  In economic terms, because of the declining marginal utility of money, the marginal utility 
of product liability–related dollars is less than the marginal utility of insurance-related dollars. 
  119  The individual would receive $40,000 as a result of product liability if her judgment were 
$100,000 and her insurance policy included a subrogation provision.  For then the insurer would 
obtain $60,000 of the judgment and she would retain $40,000. 
  120  Let U(·) represent the utility to an individual of her wealth.  To calculate the dollar equiva-
lent,  b, of the benefit from $60,000 of insurance coverage, we solve .99U($200,000  –  b) + 
.01U($160,000 – b) = .99U($200,000) + .01U($100,000).  Note that this equation means that the 
individual is indifferent between paying b for the coverage and not having coverage (if b were 
lower than that satisfying the equation, the individual would be better off with the coverage than 
not, so b would not be her willingness to pay for the coverage).  We employ the constant relative 
risk aversion utility function U(y) = y
(1  – γ)/(1 – γ), where y is an individual’s wealth and γ is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  We assume that γ is 2, which is consistent with economists’ 
estimates of γ.  See, e.g., Syngjoo Choi et al., Consistency and Heterogeneity of Individual Behav-
ior Under Uncertainty, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1921, 1931 (2007); Martin L. Weitzman, Subjective 
Expectations and Asset-Return Puzzles, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1102, 1103 (2007).  Solving for b in 
the equation above, we obtain b = $1480.52.  Similarly, to obtain the dollar equivalent of the ben-
efit of the next $40,000 of coverage provided by the liability system, we solve U($200,000 – $600 – 
b) = .99U($200,000 – $600) + .01U($160,000 – $600) (the $600 figure represents the actuarially fair 
premium for the $60,000 of insurance coverage), which results in b = $499.12.    
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$0.0247 (= $1480.52/60,000).  Note that the actuarially fair premium 
for each dollar of compensation is $0.01 (= 1% x $1), whereas, because 
of risk aversion, the individual is willing to pay $0.0125 on average for 
each dollar of compensation through the product liability system, and 
$0.0247 for each dollar of compensation through insurance.  In other 
words, she is willing to pay 25% more than the fair premium for com-
pensation through the product liability system and 147% more than 
the fair premium for compensation through insurance. 
Our second point about the value of compensation from product 
liability applies when the level of loss that an accident victim suffers is 
modest, as would often be the case when a product liability suit is 
brought as a class action.121  Then the value of compensation per dol-
lar received would be quite low because, by definition, a victim’s fi-
nancial needs after experiencing a modest loss will not be great.  Con-
sider a defectively designed water heater that leaks and causes 
individuals to incur clean-up costs of $100.  Such a loss would be a 
minor one for most individuals and, hence, so would the value of com-
pensation per dollar received for the loss.  We calculate that the benefit 
per dollar of compensation for a loss of this magnitude is $0.010005  
(= $1.0005/100), which means that the individual is not even willing to 
pay one percent more than the fair premium for compensation through 
the product liability system.122 
Our last point about the compensatory value of the product liabili-
ty system is relevant when accident victims receive damages for non-
pecuniary losses, notably for pain and suffering.  Such compensation 
tends to be of low value because pain and suffering per se usually do 
not increase one’s need for money, however much they lower one’s 
well-being.  For example, although the death of a child would cause 
the child’s parents the greatest anguish, this loss would not be likely to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  121  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 C OLUM. L. REV. 370, 417 (2000) (“[T]he traditional class action 
aggregates small claims that are individually uneconomical to litigate.”).  In the 1997 case of Am-
chen Products, the Supreme Court wrote: “The policy at the very core of the class action mechan-
ism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individ-
ual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.  A class action solves this problem by 
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.”  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. 
Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  122  Assume, as in the previous example, that the probability of a loss occurring is one percent 
and that the individual’s initial wealth is $200,000.  Then the dollar equivalent, b, of the benefit 
from $100 of compensation in the event of a loss is calculated by solving U($200,000  –  b) = 
.99U($200,000) + .01U($199,900).  Using the utility function discussed supra note 120 results in b = 
$1.0005.    
1468  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:1437 
generate a greater need for money (it probably would decrease their 
financial requirements).123 
When one takes the higher product prices due to compensation for 
pain and suffering into account — product prices will rise to cover 
manufacturers’ payments for pain and suffering damages — consumer 
welfare can be shown to decline.  To amplify, suppose an individual 
faces a one percent chance of a product accident that would cause sig-
nificant pain and suffering, for which she would be awarded $100,000.  
The expected value of her compensation is $1000 (= 1% x $100,000) 
and the product price will rise by the same amount.  Although the 
higher price will be exactly offset by the expected value of her com-
pensation, we calculate that she will be made worse off by $365.84 as a 
result of a policy of compensating for pain and suffering losses.124  
This decline in well-being occurs because the liability system effective-
ly forces individuals to purchase insurance against such losses even 
though they would not want to purchase insurance for pain and suffer-
ing if they had a choice (for example, most parents do not buy insur-
ance that would pay them money in the event of the death of a 
child because they do not find the insurance worth the premium).125  
The reduction in consumer welfare attributable to compensation for 
nonmonetary losses may be a significant consideration because, as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  123  Similarly, an injury to a person that causes significant discomfort, say a broken wrist, would 
not be expected to create financial needs beyond the cost of medical treatment and possibly the 
replacement of lost income.  The point is that pain and suffering per se do not usually enhance the 
need for money. 
  124  Let L represent the utility loss from pain and suffering.  Assume that an individual’s assets 
are $200,000 and that she is purchasing a good, say an automobile, that would cost $30,000 if 
there were no pain and suffering awards and $31,000 if there were (the higher price is due to the 
manufacturer’s liability cost for pain and suffering of $1,000 = 1% x $100,000).  The amount, w, 
by which she is made worse off as a result of receiving compensation for pain and suffering and 
having to pay $31,000 for the automobile as a result is determined by the following equation: 
U($170,000 – w) – .01L = .99U($169,000) + .01U($269,000) – .01L.  The left-hand side of the equa-
tion is, aside from w, her expected utility if she pays $30,000 for the automobile and does not re-
ceive pain and suffering damages in the event of a product-related accident.  The right-hand side 
is her expected utility if she pays $31,000 for the automobile and receives pain and suffering dam-
ages of $100,000 if an accident occurs.  Using the utility function supra note 120 and solving for w 
yields w = $365.84. 
  125  See generally SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 228–31; Kenneth J. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and 
Generalized Deductibles,  1974 S CANDINAVIAN  ACTUARIAL  J.  1; Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. 
Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 
Q.J. ECON. 143 (1977); W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That Depend on 
Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 353 (1990); Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catastrophic Illness, 21 PUB. POL’Y 149 (1973).  But see Steven P . Cro-
ley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort 
Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995) (arguing that individuals desire nonpecuniary damages and 
insurance).    
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noted previously, approximately half of all tort payments are for such 
losses.126 
In sum, the benefit of product liability with respect to compensa-
tion is not nearly as great as might first appear, and might well be 
small or could even be negative.  The justification for this conclusion 
is mainly that the compensation provided through the product liability 
system for monetary losses is incremental in nature — only in addition 
to the compensation already provided through private and public in-
surance — and that the compensation provided for nonmonetary losses 
is generally detrimental to consumers. 
V.  THE COSTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
In this Part we discuss the costs attributable to the product liability 
system: the legal expenses associated with product liability lawsuits, as 
well as the loss of consumer welfare due to the increase in product 
prices resulting from product liability litigation. 
A.  Legal Expenses 
A common measure of the legal expenses associated with tort liabil-
ity is the percentage of the total payments made by defendants that is 
retained by plaintiffs — the lower this percentage, the higher the legal 
expenses.  Tillinghast-Towers Perrin reports in a nationwide survey of 
the tort system that victims receive only $0.46 of every dollar paid by 
defendants.127  Other authors come to similar conclusions.  James   
Kakalik and Nicholas Pace estimate that in tort litigation generally, 
victims obtain $0.46 to $0.47 per dollar of tort system expenditures.128  
Also, Kakalik and his coauthors ascertain that in asbestos cases vic-
tims obtain $0.37 of every dollar paid by defendants,129 and Stephen 
Carroll and his coauthors find that in such cases victims obtain 
$0.42.130  Professor Patricia Danzon concludes that for medical mal-
practice claims victims receive $0.40 for every dollar of defendants’ 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  126  See supra p. 1462. 
  127  See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 17 (2003) (victims 
receive $0.22 for economic losses and $0.24 for noneconomic losses).  Subsequent reports do not 
state the amount obtained by plaintiffs per dollar spent by defendants.  See, e.g., TOWERS 
PERRIN, 2008 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS (2008). 
  128  See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS 
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION ix tbl.S.3 (1986).  The numbers reported in 
the text are based on the net compensation received by plaintiffs compared to the total expendi-
tures on tort litigation, using the low and high estimates in Table S.3.  Id. 
  129  JAMES  S.  KAKALIK ET AL.,  RAND  INST.  FOR  CIVIL  JUSTICE, COSTS  OF  ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION vii tbl.S.2 (1983). 
  130  STEPHEN  J.  CARROLL  ET  AL.,  RAND  INST.  FOR  CIVIL  JUSTICE, ASBESTOS  LITIGA-
TION 104 (2005).    
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liability insurance payments,131 and Peter Huber also reports that vic-
tims receive $0.40 for such claims.132  Huber states as well that in 
product liability litigation, victims obtain $0.40 for every dollar paid 
by defendants for liability insurance.133  Professors Joni Hersch and 
Kip Viscusi observe that in tort litigation in Texas, plaintiffs receive 
$0.57 for every dollar paid by defendants.134  Some of these studies do 
not take into account the administrative costs of insurers, the value of 
the time spent by litigants, or the operating costs of the judicial sys-
tem,135 and therefore overestimate the amount obtained by victims per 
dollar of total litigation-related expenditures. 
The preceding review of findings about the costs of the tort system 
implies that, for each dollar that an accident victim receives in a set-
tlement or judgment, it is reasonable to assume that a dollar of legal 
and administrative expenses is incurred.  In other words, for society to 
use the tort system to transfer money to victims is analogous to a per-
son using an ATM at which a withdrawal of $100 results in a service 
fee of $100. 
There is a sense in which the tort system is even more expensive 
than this.  For every $100 nominally received by victims, only a por-
tion of this amount is retained by them on average because some of it 
is kept by first-party insurers under subrogation arrangements.136  If, 
for example, victims retain $50 of each $100 received, society incurs 
$100 in legal expenses in order to transfer only $50 to victims.  Equiv-
alently, for each dollar that an accident victim receives, two dollars of 
legal expenses are incurred.  In all then, the tort system, and thus the 
product liability system,137 is very expensive. 
B.  Price Distortions 
We discuss here an indirect cost of product liability, that it discour-
ages socially beneficial consumption.  This reduction in consumption 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  131  Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 1339, 1369 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
  132  His claim is that “[s]ixty cents of every dollar spent on malpractice liability insurance are 
absorbed by administrative and legal costs,” which implies that only $0.40 would be left for vic-
tims.  See HUBER, supra note 11, at 151.   
  133  See id. 
  134  Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 330, 359 tbl.5 (2007). 
  135  For example, Hersch & Viscusi take only partial account of the administrative costs of lia-
bility insurers and exclude the value of the time of litigants and the costs of the judicial system.   
See id. 
  136  See supra pp. 1463–64. 
  137  We are assuming that the costs of the product liability system are comparable to those of the 
tort system generally.    
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occurs, as we now explain, because product liability leads product 
prices to rise undesirably as a result of litigation costs and the award 
of damages for nonmonetary losses. 
Litigation cost–related price distortion.  We observed in Part III 
that product liability causes product prices to reflect product risks and 
hence may help consumers to make correct purchase decisions.  It was 
assumed there, for simplicity, that the product liability system operated 
without generating litigation costs.  When litigation costs are taken in-
to account, however, product liability causes prices to rise too much 
and consumers to purchase too little. 
To elaborate, recall that in our example in Part III the price of 
widgets under product liability was $11, the sum of the $10 production 
cost and $1 in expected harm, and thus consumers bought widgets if 
and only if they valued them more highly than $11.138  Now suppose 
that a manufacturer’s litigation costs are $0.40 per widget on average 
and that a consumer’s litigation costs are also $0.40 per widget.  Then 
the price of a widget would have to be $11.40 in order for manufactur-
ers to cover all of their costs, including $0.40 in litigation costs.  Be-
cause consumers also bear $0.40 in litigation costs per widget, they 
would not purchase a widget unless they valued it more highly than 
$11.80 (= $11.40 + $0.40).  Consequently, some consumers would be 
undesirably discouraged from buying widgets because the effective 
price of widgets would exceed $11.  For instance, a consumer who 
places a value of $11.50 on a widget would have obtained a $0.50 net 
benefit (= $11.50 – $11) from purchasing one, but she would not buy 
one if there is product liability because the effective price would be 
$11.80.  This foregone benefit of $0.50 is a consumer welfare loss, and 
such losses occur for all consumers who refrain from buying widgets 
because of the litigation cost–related price increase.139 
We say that this welfare loss is caused by a price distortion because 
the effective price of widgets exceeds the $11 effective price that would 
be applicable were there no liability and thus no litigation costs.  Con-
sumer welfare losses due to this price distortion are obviously distinct 
from the direct losses due to the litigation costs themselves.  In the ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  138  See supra section III.A, pp. 1459–61. 
  139  For simplicity, we have been implicitly assuming in this paragraph that consumers correctly 
estimate their expected litigation costs.  However, the point that litigation cost–related price in-
creases cause consumer welfare losses also holds if consumers misperceive such costs.  The only 
difference is that the magnitude of the welfare losses depends on the degree to which consumers 
underestimate or overestimate expected litigation costs.  In the example in the text,   
we said that a consumer would add to the price of $11.40 the $0.40 of litigation costs that she 
would bear on average.  But if the consumer underestimates expected litigation costs, she will add 
less than $0.40 to $11.40, so that the distortion due to litigation costs would be lessened.  Con-
versely, if the consumer overestimates such costs, the distortion due to litigation costs would be  
exacerbated.    
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treme, the litigation cost–related price increase due to product liability 
could be so high that it would discourage most consumers from pur-
chasing the product and consequently cause the manufacturer to with-
draw the product from the marketplace or to go out of business.  If so, 
all consumers who would have purchased the product in the absence 
of product liability will suffer welfare losses. 
Nonmonetary loss–related price distortion.  W e  n o t e d  i n  P a r t  I V  
that product liability causes product prices to rise to reflect payments 
by firms for nonmonetary losses, and we explained that consumers are 
made worse off as a consequence because the value they attach to 
compensation for nonmonetary losses is less than its cost to them in 
the form of higher prices.140  Our point here is that, because of this ef-
fect, some individuals will be inefficiently discouraged from buying 
products in the first place.  In other words, these individuals are made 
worse off by product liability not because they are effectively forced to 
purchase a type of insurance that they do not want when they buy the 
product, but rather because they are induced by the high price of the 
product not to buy it. 
Consider, for example, parents who contemplate purchasing a bi-
cycle helmet for their child.  Suppose that the price of the helmet is $5 
higher than it otherwise would be due to the manufacturer’s expected 
liability payments for nonmonetary losses if the helmet is defective and 
fails to protect the child in an accident.  Suppose also that the value to 
the parents of being able to obtain damages for such losses is only $1.  
Then product liability would lower the net value of the helmet to the 
parents by $4, which might undesirably dissuade them from buying it.  
This detrimental effect of product liability might be significant because 
of the importance of nonmonetary losses. 
VI.  IS PRODUCT LIABILITY SOCIALLY WORTHWHILE GIVEN  
ITS BENEFITS AND COSTS? 
In this Part we compare the benefits of product liability to its costs, 
first for products that are widely sold, and then for products that are 
not widely sold.  We are focusing here on central tendencies; as the 
reader knows, the assessment of benefits and costs will not be uniform 
within each category of products. 
A.  Product Liability for Widely Sold Products 
We have explained why product liability would not be expected to 
increase very much the safety of products for which market forces and 
regulation are strong.  We observed that this point is most relevant for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  140  See supra pp. 1467–69.    
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widely sold products, and we found no statistical evidence suggesting 
that product liability has in fact enhanced product safety for the three 
widely sold products that have been studied: general aviation aircraft, 
automobiles, and the DPT vaccine.141  We also considered whether 
product liability improves the purchase decisions of consumers by in-
creasing the prices of risky products.  We concluded that this effect 
will be beneficial to the extent that consumers misperceive product 
risks or have first-party accident insurance,142 but that it will be dis-
tortionary to the extent that prices rise due to litigation costs or pay-
ment of pain and suffering damages.143  We inquired as well about the 
degree to which product liability promotes the compensation of vic-
tims, and found that this benefit is limited — because most accident 
victims already will have some insurance coverage — and may even be 
negative — because approximately half of the compensation is for pain 
and suffering losses for which individuals generally do not want to be 
insured.144  Finally, we emphasized that the costs of the product liabili-
ty system are great.145 
Before assessing the desirability of product liability for widely sold 
products, we need to explain why its effect on prices is unlikely to be 
desirable.  First, it can be shown that the price-signaling benefit asso-
ciated with the misperception of product risk will be less than the liti-
gation cost–related price distortion unless consumers underestimate 
risks by more than fifty percent or overestimate them by more than 
one hundred percent.146  Given the extensive availability of informa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  141  See supra section II.C, pp. 1453–59. 
  142  See supra Part III, pp. 1459–62. 
  143  See supra section V.B, pp. 1470–72. 
  144  See supra Part IV, pp. 1462–69. 
  145  See supra Part V, pp. 1469–72. 
  146  To demonstrate this point, assume that the demand curve for a product is linear, P = a – bQ, 
where P is the price, Q is the quantity, and a and b are positive parameters.  Let C be the cost per 
unit of production, H be the expected harm per unit, and λ be the degree of underestimation of 
risk (so consumers believe that the expected harm per unit is (1 – λ)H).  Assume also that the par-
ties’ litigation costs equal the amount of money obtained by the plaintiff.  See supra section V.A, 
pp. 1469–70.  This implies that each party’s litigation costs are (1/3)H (for then the plaintiff ob-
tains (2/3)H after paying her litigation costs of (1/3)H, and the defendant incurs litigation costs of 
(1/3)H).  Under these assumptions, the deadweight loss (the reduction in social welfare from its 
ideal level) in the absence of liability can be shown to be .5{[(a – C – (1 – λ)H)/b] – [(a – C – 
H)/b]}λH; this is the area of the triangle that is above the demand curve and below the price line 
at C + H, between the ideal consumption level and the higher level that occurs due to mispercep-
tions.  Similarly, the deadweight loss in the presence of liability is .5[(2 – λ)(H/3)/b][(2 – λ)(H/3)]; 
this is the area of the triangle that is below the demand curve and above the price line at C + H, 
between the ideal consumption level and the lower level that occurs due to the litigation cost–
related price increase.  Setting these two expressions equal to each other and solving for λ yields λ 
= .5.  It follows that if λ is less than .5, the deadweight loss in the presence of liability exceeds the 
deadweight loss in the absence of liability.  In other words, the price-signaling benefit is less than 
the litigation cost–related price distortion unless λ exceeds .5.  Similarly, it can be shown that if 
consumers overestimate product risks, the price-signaling benefit is less than the litigation cost–
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tion about product risks that we discussed above,147 it seems unlikely 
that consumers would generally misperceive risks to this degree.   
Second, the price-signaling benefit of product liability as a corrective 
for the price distortion due to consumers having first-party insurance is 
limited because such insurance typically covers only monetary 
losses.148  And this benefit, too, cannot be obtained without causing a 
related price distortion due to litigation costs.149  Third, as we noted, 
there also is a price distortion caused by compensating consumers for 
nonmonetary losses.150  On balance, these considerations do not pro-
vide a clear basis for finding that the price-signaling benefit outweighs 
the price distortion cost; and if this benefit does outweigh this cost, the 
difference seems unlikely to be significant. 
We can now take stock of the benefits and costs of product liability 
for widely sold products.  We have just explained why the price-
signaling benefit might not exceed the corresponding price distortion 
cost and, if it does, why it is not likely to exceed the distortion cost by 
much.  We have also concluded that product liability tends to have on-
ly a modest product safety benefit for widely sold products and that 
there is little reason for believing that product liability has a significant 
compensatory benefit.  This leaves on the ledger the legal costs of the 
product liability system, which are substantial, equaling or exceeding 
the payments received by product accident victims.  Hence, our analy-
sis suggests that product liability will often, if not usually, be socially 
undesirable for widely sold products — or, at the very least, that the 
case for product liability is not easy to make in this context. 
We next consider for concreteness the benefits and costs of product 
liability for widely sold products in two industries discussed previously. 
Pharmaceuticals.  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  D P T  v a c c i n e ,  a s  w e  n o t e d  
above, product liability has not resulted in an improvement in product 
safety — the safety of the vaccine did not change despite a large in-
crease in manufacturers’ exposure to liability risk.151  Product liability 
has, however, led to a twenty-fold increase in the price of the DPT 
vaccine152 and an undesirable decrease in the number of preschool 
children who were vaccinated of more than one million.153  The com-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
related price distortion unless λ is less than –1, that is, unless the perceived risk is more than 
double the actual risk. 
  147  See supra section II.A, pp. 1443–50. 
  148  See supra section III.B, pp. 1461–62. 
  149  Note, however, that this price distortion is the same one associated with the first point.  The 
two price distortions are not additive. 
  150  See supra p. 1472. 
  151  See supra p. 1457. 
  152  Manning, supra note 85, at 273. 
  153  See Richard L. Manning, Is the Insurance Aspect of Producer Liability Valued by Consum-
ers? Liability Changes and Childhood Vaccine Consumption, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 37, 47 
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pensatory benefits of product liability for vaccine accident victims are 
likely to be limited for the general reasons discussed above.  Finally, 
DPT product liability litigation involves legal costs of approximately 
five dollars for every dollar received in compensation.154  Thus, prod-
uct liability for DPT-related accidents appears to be socially   
undesirable. 
With regard to prescription drugs generally, physicians should have 
relatively good information about adverse outcomes and therefore 
market forces should work relatively well to discipline makers of un-
safe drugs.  Also, as we said, the FDA actively regulates prescription 
drugs by seeking to winnow out unsafe drugs in the testing stage, mon-
itoring the safety of drugs that it approves for sale, and regulating la-
bels and warnings.155  Consequently, the effect of product liability on 
the safety of pharmaceutical products might not be significant, and we 
are not aware of evidence that suggests otherwise.  Additionally, for 
reasons discussed above, we assume that product liability has limited 
price-signaling and compensatory value.  The costs of pharmaceutical-
related product liability litigation, however, are quite large.156  It is at 
least plausible, therefore, that product liability is not socially beneficial 
for many pharmaceutical products. 
General aviation aircraft.  A s  w e  o b s e r v e d  e a r l i e r ,  t w o  s t u d i e s  
found that a substantial increase in product liability litigation had no 
apparent effect on the safety of general aviation aircraft.157  This find-
ing is not surprising because, as we noted, buyers of aircraft have 
strong incentives to learn about aircraft risks, and the FAA extensively 
regulates the design and maintenance of aircraft.  The increased litiga-
tion did, however, cause the prices of general aviation aircraft to rise 
dramatically, resulting in a steep decline in sales158 and leading Cessna, 
a dominant manufacturer, to halt production of several of its mod-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(1996).  We are presuming that it is socially desirable for all children to be vaccinated, in part be-
cause pertussis and diphtheria are communicable diseases.  Most states require immunization at 
school entry.  Id. at 41. 
  154  See Manning, supra note 85, at 271. 
  155  See supra pp. 1450–51. 
  156  See Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effec-
tive?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2008, at 85, 94–95 (suggesting that the deadweight losses to con-
sumers and producers from the price increases due to product liability litigation in the pharma-
ceutical industry are in the tens of billions of dollars). 
  157  See supra pp. 1455–56. 
  158  Sales of new airplanes by general aviation manufacturers declined from 17,811 units in 1978 
to 1143 units a decade later, a decline of 93.5%.  Martin, supra note 69, at 483.  Manufacturers 
attributed the decline to price increases that had occurred as a result of enhanced product liability 
exposure.  See General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 473 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 100th 
Cong. 50 (1987) (statement of Robert Martin, attorney representing Beech Aircraft).    
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els.159  This outcome was likely to have been socially undesirable be-
cause, if buyers of aircraft were generally well-informed about the rel-
evant risks, they presumably had been making appropriate purchase 
decisions prior to the price increases.  Also, the compensatory rationale 
for product liability in regard to aircraft accidents is questionable, as it 
appears no different from the compensatory rationale for product lia-
bility in general.  Finally, the cost of product liability litigation con-
cerning general aviation accidents was significant.160  In light of the 
preceding observations, the case favoring product liability for general 
aviation aircraft seems weak. 
B.  Product Liability for Products That Are Not Widely Sold 
As we have explained, market forces and regulation are likely to be 
less effective in promoting safety for products that are not widely sold 
than for products that are widely sold.  Hence, the safety benefit of 
product liability will generally be greater for such products.  This ob-
servation strengthens the case for product liability for products that 
are not widely sold, though our analysis of the other benefits of prod-
uct liability, and of its costs, applies more or less unchanged. 
VII.  THE PREVAILING SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT  
OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
In this Part we summarize the views of courts, academics, the me-
dia, and public policy organizations about product liability.  We ex-
plain that they broadly approve of such liability even though some 
have criticized it as too expansive.  However, we find that neither the 
proponents nor the critics of product liability undertake a serious eval-
uation of its benefits and costs. 
A.  Judicial Opinions 
Over the last century, courts have generally increased the scope of 
the liability of firms for harms done to their customers.  They have al-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  159  See DONALD M. PATTILLO, A HISTORY IN THE MAKING: 80 TURBULENT YEARS IN 
THE AMERICAN GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY 155 (1998) (“The Conquest I and II were the 
last of Cessna’s once-extensive twin-engined line to remain in production, but all aircraft other 
than the Citation series and the Caravan were suspended indefinitely in May 1986.”).  The CEO 
of Cessna, Russ Meyer, said that Cessna’s lightplane production would resume if a more favorable 
liability environment emerged.  Mark R. Twombly, Kill the Messenger, AOPA PILOT, Aug. 1993, 
at 125.  After the General Aviation Revitalization Act passed in 1994, Meyer stated that Cessna 
would restart production of three single-engine aircraft models.  Thomas A. Horne, Manufactur-
ers Face the Future, AOPA PILOT, Sept. 1994, at 5. 
  160  See Martin, supra note 69, at 482–83 (finding that from 1971 through 1976, Beech spent $18 
million insuring and defending product liability claims, of which only about $3 million went to 
claimants).    
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tered the foundation of such liability from contract — predicated on a 
firm having sold a product directly to a customer — to tort — not re-
quiring a firm to have sold its product directly to a customer.161  In re-
cent years, however, courts have acted to curtail product liability to 
some extent.162 
One important rationale for product liability offered in judicial 
opinions is that it promotes fairness, especially the notion that a firm 
that benefits from selling a dangerous product should have to pay for 
the harms that the product causes.  For example, in Brooks v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.,163 the court stated, “The burden of illness from danger-
ous products . . . should be placed upon those who profit from its pro-
duction . . . .  That burden should not be imposed exclusively on the 
innocent victim.”164  Naturally, this conception of fairness, like others 
to which the courts might appeal,165 is not framed in terms of the ben-
efits of product liability that we have considered here. 
Courts do, however, often mention the instrumental benefits of 
product liability when they comment on its public policy justifications.  
Yet on these occasions their discussion is typically perfunctory and 
their claims often seem illogical.  The influential concurring opinion of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  161  1 D AVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN  & OWEN  ON 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.4, at 9–14 (3d ed. 2000); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing 
the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 695–712 (1993); 
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 465–83 (1985); William L. Prosser, The 
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791–800 (1966). 
  162  See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 480 (1990) (“This 
quiet revolution is a significant turn in the direction of judicial decision making away from ex-
tending the boundaries of products liability and toward placing significant limitations on plain-
tiffs’ rights to recover in tort for product-related injuries.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. 
Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without 
Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1271 & n.28 (1991) (listing examples of court decisions since the 
1980s that have curtailed product liability). 
  163  902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995). 
  164  Id. at 58 (quoting Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982)); 
see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (“The purpose of 
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by 
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons . . . .”); 
Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wis. 1990) (“[T]he risk of loss associated with the use of 
defective products should be borne by those who have created the risk and who have reaped the 
profit by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), su-
pra note 1, § 2 reporters’ notes cmt. a (“[T]he manufacturer should be strictly liable because it 
profits from its activity, which inevitably involves defect-caused harm to others.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 402A cmt. c (“[T]he justification for the strict liability 
has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has under-
taken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may 
be injured by it . . . .”). 
  165  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a (mentioning disappointment of 
“reasonable expectations of product performance” as a fairness rationale).    
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Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,166 concerning 
harm done by a defective Coca Cola bottle, is illustrative.  There Jus-
tice Traynor stated: “[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be 
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and 
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.  It is evi-
dent that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard 
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.”167  This is es-
sentially the only language in the opinion that considers the effect of 
product liability on product safety,168 and its reasoning is problematic.  
It is true that manufacturers may be able to reduce risk and that con-
sumers may be unable to do so, but this does not imply that liability is 
needed to induce manufacturers to lower risk.  As we have stressed, 
manufacturers would not want to market dangerous products if their 
sales would fall in the wake of product-caused accidents.  In other 
words, the opinion does not address the possibility that product safety 
might be achieved in the absence of liability because of market forces. 
Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola does, however, raise the is-
sue of consumer knowledge about products:  
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for him-
self the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed 
package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts 
of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing de-
vices such as trade-marks.  .  .  . Consumers no longer approach products 
warily but accept them on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufac-
turer or the trade mark.169   
One might agree that consumers will often be unable to learn about 
product risks from direct inspection of products.  But this inability to 
examine products does not bar consumers from learning about product 
risks from the print media, television, the internet, and government 
agencies — and, as we have emphasized, these sources provide exten-
sive information about product safety.170  Further, Justice Traynor’s 
view that firms employ their reputations opportunistically to sell risky 
products is questionable: it would be difficult for a firm to build and 
maintain a reputation for product safety without having a true record 
of product safety.  Finally, and most importantly, Justice Traynor does 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  166  150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
  167  Id. at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
  168  There are two additional sentences bearing on deterrence that are summary in nature: “It is 
to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to 
the public. . . . It is to the public interest to prevent injury to the public from any defective goods 
by the imposition of civil liability generally.”  Id. at 441. 
  169  Id. at 443. 
  170  See supra pp. 1445–48.  Of course, at the time of the Escola decision, television was in its 
infancy and the internet did not exist.    
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not recognize that whether consumers have knowledge of product risks 
influences whether firms have incentives to reduce those risks. 
Justice Traynor’s Escola opinion also fails to mention that the regu-
lation of product risks may lead firms to take desirable precautions 
and thus reduces the need for product liability.171  Additionally, the 
opinion does not consider whether product liability has in fact led to 
improvements in safety. 
The abbreviated and intellectually unsatisfactory character of Jus-
tice Traynor’s statements about product liability and safety in Escola 
is representative of what is found in other decisions that refer to the 
risk reduction rationale for product liability.172  For example, the court 
in  U.S. Airways v. Elliott Equipment Co.173 states without analysis 
that “imposing strict liability here would serve as an incentive to   
safety because [defendant] Fluidics . . . is in a better position than a 
consumer to prevent circulation of defective products.”174  Here we see 
the same non sequitur as in Escola.  Just because the manufacturer is 
in the superior position to prevent defects does not imply that liability 
is needed to improve product safety; market forces and regulation   
may already lead the manufacturer to prevent defects.  As in Escola 
and U.S. Airways, the occasional references in other opinions to the ef-
fect of product liability on product safety are generally conclusory and 
presumptive.175 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  171  Justice Traynor in Escola does mention the section of the Health and Safety Code that “pro-
hibits the manufacturing, preparing, compounding, packing, selling . . . of any adulterated food” 
and that imposes strict criminal liability on manufacturers.  Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., 
concurring).  He argues that this “public policy of protecting the public from dangerous products 
placed on the market” should be expanded beyond food products and containers.  Id.  Here Jus-
tice Traynor is using regulation as a justification for expanded product liability, not suggesting 
that regulation may be a substitute for product liability. 
  172  Justice Traynor did not even mention the safety rationale explicitly in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), an influential product liability case. 
  173  No. 06-1481, 2008 WL 4425238 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2008). 
  174  Id. at *5.  This case involved injury to an employee of U.S. Airways when a boom supplied 
by Fluidics for deicing aircraft collapsed.  The court presumed that liability would be needed to 
induce a firm like Fluidics to ensure the safety of its booms.  But the court did not ask whether 
Fluidics would have a motivation, even in the absence of liability, to supply safe booms in order 
to retain its business with U.S. Airways and other airlines.  Moreover, although the court noted 
that local authorities regulated the safety of airport equipment, id. at *1, it did not consider this in 
assessing the need for liability. 
  175  See, e.g., All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 197 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(providing only a cursory treatment of the safety rationale for product liability and stating that 
“[p]roduct liability promotes safer products by placing responsibility on the manufacturer, which 
is the party most able to prevent harm”); Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) 
(stating without elaboration that “[t]he manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard 
against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects; thus, holding it liable for defects 
and failure to warn of harmful effects will provide an incentive to product safety”); Bell v. Jet 
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171 (La. 1985) (asserting that “in many instances the manufacturer 
would have no incentive to make and market a safer product” if its liability were reduced); Heath 
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The discussion of the safety rationale for product liability in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is similar.  The Re-
statement mentions the safety justification in only a few sentences,   
assuming its importance, and does not consider that market forces   
and regulation may encourage product safety.176  The Restatement 
(Second) merely notes in a phrase that the provision of safety is a ra-
tionale for product liability.177 
Most courts are silent about the price-signaling benefit of product 
liability, though some have observed that product liability can have the 
desirable effect of causing the prices of defective products to rise, 
dampening their consumption.  For example, in Bynum v. FMC 
Corp.,178 the court stated that “increased prices will  .  .  .  discourage 
consumers from purchasing risky products and thereby lower total ac-
cident costs to society.”179  This view, however, fails to recognize that, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 293 (N.H. 1983) (referring to deterrence in only one sen-
tence, which claimed that “without the stimulus of plaintiffs’ products liability actions, the incen-
tive to improve products and make them safer would not exist”); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 
106, 112 (N.J. 1996) (claiming that the state’s interest in product safety “is furthered through the 
recognition of claims and the imposition of liability based on principles of strict products-liability 
law”); Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 575 (Ohio 1981) (including only a single 
reference to product safety, the statement that “the public interest in human life and safety can 
best be protected by subjecting manufacturers of defective products to strict liability in tort when 
the products cause harm”); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1967) (arguing that “the 
manufacturer has the greatest ability to control the risk created by his product since he may in-
itiate or adopt inspection and quality control measures thereby preventing defective products 
from reaching the consumer”).  There are, however, occasional opinions in which the reasoning 
about deterrence is not conclusory because they discuss whether imposing liability would promote 
product safety in the particular circumstances.  See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 
444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983) (arguing that imposing liability would not be likely to foster product safe-
ty because market forces already accomplish this — the plaintiff, a purchaser of military equip-
ment, is knowledgeable and would not buy dangerous products); Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. 
Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 653 N.E.2d 661, 672 (Ohio 1995) (explaining that product liability does 
not promote product safety when buyers are knowledgeable about product risks and specify the 
design of the product). 
  176  We have found three passages on deterrence in the Restatement (Third): “On the premise 
that tort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety incentives, imposing strict liability 
on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing defects encourages greater investment in 
product safety . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a.  “Subsections (b) and (c), 
which impose liability for products that are defectively designed or sold without adequate warn-
ings or instructions . . . achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated on negli-
gence.  The emphasis is on creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safe-
ty in designing and marketing products.”  Id.  “Strict liability for harm caused by manufacturing 
defects has been supported on the ground that it promotes investment in product safety.”  Id. § 2 
reporters’ note cmt. a. 
  177  The Restatement (Second) states that a justification for strict liability is that “the consum-
er of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the 
proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND), su-
pra note 1, § 402A cmt. c.  A full reading of comment c suggests that the quoted statement refers 
to the safety rationale for product liability. 
  178  770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985). 
  179  Id. at 571.    
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to the extent that consumers have knowledge of product risks, an in-
crease in the price of a dangerous product is not needed to induce 
them to refrain from buying it — they would not purchase a product 
that they knew to be dangerous, regardless of whether its price was 
higher due to product liability.180  Other courts that mention the effect 
of product prices on purchases generally make the same error, believ-
ing that it is ordinarily beneficial for prices to reflect product risks.181  
Moreover, none of the product liability opinions that we have ex-
amined recognize that product prices will also increase due to litigation 
costs and thereby may undesirably chill the purchase of products.   
These mistakes of the courts are also made in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Products Liability.182 
Concerning compensation, Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in 
Escola is again illustrative of judicial thinking generally.  He states 
that “[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an 
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for 
the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer.”183  Here Justice 
Traynor provides a compensation-based argument for product liability, 
but he does not consider that many individuals already have various 
forms of private and public insurance.  He also does not take into ac-
count that, because insurance policies frequently have subrogation 
provisions, only a portion of the liability payments made by defen-
dants result in additional compensation to plaintiffs.  Finally, Justice 
Traynor does not realize that compensating individuals for pain and 
suffering tends to be detrimental because, as we explained, this prac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  180  But see McKay, 704 F.2d at 452 (observing that prices will beneficially discourage consum-
ers from buying risky products only if consumers underestimate product risks). 
  181  See, e.g., LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 233 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1981) 
(recognizing the principle, though not finding it applicable to the case at issue, that a firm “will 
pass the costs of injuries along to the consumer in the form of increased prices for more dangerous 
products and that the consumer will be more likely to buy safer goods because they will be rela-
tively less expensive”); Belle Bonfils Mem’l Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122 n.7 (Colo. 
1983) (“Enterprise liability assumes that a product’s market price ought to include the cost of ac-
cidents caused by defects in the product, and that consumer demand will shift accordingly to safer  
substitutes.”). 
  182  See R ESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a (“Some courts and commentators 
also have said that strict liability discourages the consumption of defective products by causing 
the purchase price of products to reflect, more than would a rule of negligence, the cost of de-
fects.”); id. § 2 reporters’ note cmt. a.  There is no discussion of the price-signaling rationale for 
product liability in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1. 
  183  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).  
Justice Traynor also observes that the cost to the manufacturer of providing this implicit insur-
ance can, through higher product prices, be “distributed among the public as a cost of doing busi-
ness.”  Id.  This is true, but it is a very expensive form of insurance for individuals.  Our discus-
sion of litigation costs implies that consumers effectively pay premiums (in the form of higher 
product prices and the litigation costs that they bear) of approximately twice their expected bene-
fits.  See supra section V.A, pp. 1469–70.    
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tice effectively forces them to purchase a type of insurance that most 
individuals do not want.184  When other opinions and the Restate-
ments address the compensation benefit of product liability, they also 
do so in a spare manner and without reference either to the role of vic-
tims’ insurance coverage or to the undesirable effect of compensation 
for pain and suffering.185 
With respect to the costs of the product liability system, the courts 
say little or nothing.  Only a tangential reference to litigation costs is 
made by Justice Traynor in Escola,186 and only a sentence is devoted 
to this topic in the Restatements.187  Most opinions omit discussion of 
litigation costs altogether.188 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  184  See supra pp. 1467–69.  This omission is not surprising because the point at issue was not 
developed until after the Escola opinion. 
  185  Courts typically devote only a sentence to this topic (if they even mention it).  See, e.g., All 
Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 197 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Manufacturers can 
set prices to spread the risk of defects over the entire market for their products.”); Sindell v. Abbot 
Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (“[T]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be 
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can 
be insured by the manufacturer . . . .” (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring))); 
Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171 (La. 1985) (“[One] basic goal[] of . . . strict products 
liability . . . [is] the placing of the burden of accidental injuries caused by defective products on 
those who market them, to be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can 
be obtained.”); Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 653 N.E.2d 661, 672 (Ohio 
1995) (“[M]anufacturers are in a better position to bear the costs of injuries, because they have the 
ability to ‘distribute the losses of the few among the many who purchase the products’ by charg-
ing higher prices.” (citation omitted)); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 784 (W. 
Va. 1991) (“[P]roduct liability is concerned with spreading the cost of inevitable accidents.  Inher-
ent in this cost-spreading function is the collection of what amounts to insurance premiums from 
all the purchasers of products . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 1, § 2 cmt. a (“[B]etween [sellers] and innocent victims who suffer harm because of defective 
products, the product sellers as business entities are in a better position than are individual users 
and consumers to insure against such losses.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 402A 
cmt. c (“[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products in-
tended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of pro-
duction against which liability insurance can be obtained . . . .”).  But see McKay, 704 F.2d at 452 
(recognizing that the plaintiff would receive generous compensation for his accident through the 
Veterans’ Benefits Act). 
  186  His only mention of litigation costs concerns the comparison between a regime of product 
liability and a regime in which injured consumers sue retailers and retailers sue manufacturers (he 
describes the latter as “needlessly circuitous and engender[ing] wasteful litigation”).  Escola, 150 
P.2d at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
  187  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 reporters’ note cmt. a (“Another objective tradi-
tionally thought to be promoted by strict liability is the reduction of transaction costs, which in-
clude the costs of operating the accident reparation system.”). 
  188  See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); U.S. Airways v. Elliott Equip. 
Co., No. 06-1481, 2008 WL 4425238 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2008); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995).  But see Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234, 1238–39 
& n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the significance of legal costs and citing academic literature on 
their magnitude).    
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In sum, judicial opinions usually devote no more than a few sen-
tences to the safety and compensation benefits of product liability, gen-
erally overstating them, and largely ignore the costs of product liabili-
ty.  It is not surprising, therefore, that when courts consider public 
policy arguments concerning product liability, they typically find the 
arguments to be supportive of such liability. 
B.  Academic Writing 
Early academic writing on product liability was oriented toward 
traditional legal concerns and instrumental goals, while much of the 
more recent scholarly writing on product liability has adopted an   
avowedly economic approach in addressing questions of legal policy.  
We now review both bodies of literature. 
Traditional academic writing.  The traditional literature on product 
liability is exemplified by the work of such authors as Professors Flem-
ing James, William Prosser, Page Keeton, and James Henderson.189  
These commentators generally favor product liability.190  One justifica-
tion that they often mention is that it advances conceptions of fairness.  
Prosser, for example, writes that “[t]he public interest in human life, 
health and safety . . . justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of such 
products, of full responsibility for the harm they cause”;191 and Page 
Keeton states that “it is important to recognize as a basic reason for 
liability that a consumer’s expectations have been frustrated.”192 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  189  See, e.g., FOWLER  V.  HARPER  &  FLEMING  JAMES,  JR.,  THE  LAW  OF  TORTS  (1956); 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971); Henderson & Ei-
senberg,  supra note 162; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 162; Fleming James, Jr., General 
Products — Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957)  
[hereinafter James, General Products]; Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Prone-
ness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1950); Page Keeton, Products Liability — Some 
Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329 (1966) [hereinafter Keeton, Prod-
ucts Liability: Observations]; Page Keeton, Products Liability — The Nature and Extent of Strict 
Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693 [hereinafter Keeton, Products Liability: Nature]; Prosser, supra 
note  161.  Other traditional scholars of product liability include Robert E. Keeton, David G. 
Owen, Gary Schwartz, and Marshall Shapo. 
  190  See, e.g., James, General Products, supra note 189, at 923–24 (arguing that product liability 
is desirable because it spreads risks); Priest, supra note 161, at 505 (describing Prosser’s important 
role as Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of T orts, which adopted Section 402A, imposing 
liability on sellers for injuries from defective products); Prosser, supra note 161, at 799–800 (sug-
gesting that strict product liability be adopted).  Page Keeton and James Henderson appear to 
favor some form of product liability, although both are concerned about its proper design, espe-
cially the scope of the definition of product defect.  See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 162; 
Keeton, Products Liability: Observations, supra note 189, at 1330–34. 
  191  William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960).  In advancing this argument, it is clear that Prosser is not referring 
to the effect of liability on product safety or on the compensation of victims. 
  192  Keeton, Products Liability: Nature, supra note 189, at 695.    
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In addition, traditional writing usually considers public policy ra-
tionales for product liability, including improved safety.  For instance, 
James believes that an object of such liability is to “cut down acci-
dents” and argues that “the manufacturer is in a peculiarly strategic 
position to improve the safety of his products, so that the pressure of 
strict liability could scarcely be exerted at a better point.”193  But tradi-
tional writing rarely includes discussion, even of a qualitative nature, 
of how market forces and regulation may already accomplish some 
risk reduction, and thus why the effect of product liability on safety 
may be limited.  Most traditional writing also fails to inquire whether 
there is empirical evidence concerning the influence of product liability 
on product safety.  In sum, even though this writing justifies product 
liability in part on the basis of its ability to reduce risk, it does not of-
fer sound reasons for believing that such liability actually has a signifi-
cant effect on safety. 
With regard to price-signaling, traditional writers are, like the 
courts, mostly silent.  We have been unable to find in the traditional 
literature on product liability more than a few references to this   
issue.194 
The traditional scholarship predominantly views product liability 
as desirably contributing to the compensation of accident victims.   
James in particular is well known for having emphasized the general 
risk-spreading role of manufacturer liability, declaring that “the enter-
prise which causes losses should lift them from the individual victims 
and distribute them widely.”195  Similarly, Page Keeton and his coau-
thors write that firms “have the capacity to distribute the losses of the 
few among the many who purchase the products . . . by charging high-
er prices.”196  Although these writers speak of the beneficial effect of 
product liability in promoting compensation, they generally overlook 
the point that private and public insurance already serve this purpose 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  193  James, General Products, supra note 189, at 923.  Some commentators, though, are skeptical 
of the effect of product liability on product safety.  See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 191, at 1119. 
  194  One such reference is Henderson & Twerski, supra note 162, at 1273, observing that “prod-
ucts liability would reduce the consumption of relatively risky products by increasing their mone-
tary costs to users and consumers.” 
  195  James,  General Products,  supra note 189, at 924;  see also Priest, supra note 161, at 470 
(“James promoted one principle — risk distribution — above all others.”).  James, like Justice 
Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944), overlooked the point that 
when risk distribution is accomplished through product liability, resulting in higher product pric-
es, individuals pay effective premiums substantially greater than their expected benefits.  This 
mistake is generally made by traditional academic writers who justify product liability on the 
ground that it spreads risk through higher product prices. 
  196  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 693 (5th ed. 
1984).    
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to a significant degree.197  Moreover, they do not consider that awards 
for pain and suffering constitute a form of insurance that individuals 
ordinarily do not want and that therefore lowers their well-being.   
Hence, even though traditional writing views compensation as a par-
amount rationale for product liability, it fails to address questions of 
obvious importance about the degree to which product liability actual-
ly facilitates that goal. 
Finally, traditional writing typically omits the costs of the product 
liability system from its analysis, although some authors mention this 
factor in passing.198 
To summarize, the traditional literature, like judicial opinions, 
views product liability favorably because it furthers certain fairness 
goals and yields safety and compensation benefits.  However, the tradi-
tional writing does not undertake a realistic assessment of these   
benefits, and it essentially disregards the costs of the product liability 
system. 
Economically oriented academic writing.  During the last several 
decades, a substantial literature has emerged that adopts a self-
consciously economic viewpoint in analyzing product liability.199  One 
branch of this literature emphasizes the theoretical point that product 
liability has a beneficial effect on product safety to the degree that 
consumers lack information about product risks.  This writing, which 
includes articles by Professors Michael Spence and Steven Shavell, also 
examines how different rules of product liability function under vary-
ing assumptions concerning imperfect information.200  I t  d o e s  n o t ,  
however, attempt to assess empirically the effect of product liability on 
product safety. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  197  The only exception of which we are aware is Keeton, Products Liability: Observations, su-
pra note 189, at 1333–34, who comments that the existence of private insurance reduces the need 
for product liability to accomplish risk spreading. 
  198  See, e.g., Keeton, Products Liability: Nature, supra note 189, at 693 (noting that a potential 
problem with product liability is the “economic and sociological costs of adjudications”). 
  199  This literature is discussed in DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 66, at 188–264; 
Geistfeld, supra note 89, at 287; Kessler & Rubinfeld, supra note 89, at 361–63; and W. Kip Viscu-
si,  Products Liability,  in 3 T HE  NEW  PALGRAVE  DICTIONARY  OF  ECONOMICS  AND  THE 
LAW 131 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
  200  See sources cited supra note 92; see also Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 
Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1187 (1995); Dennis Epple & 
Artur Raviv, Product Safety: Liability Rules, Market Structure, and Imperfect Information, 68 
AM. ECON. REV. 80 (1978); Victor P . Goldberg, The Economics of Product Safety and Imperfect 
Information, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 683 (1974); Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: 
Implications of Some Changing Property Rights, 84 Q.J. ECON. 611 (1970); A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power,  14 
BELL J. ECON. 581 (1983).    
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Another body of economic literature focuses on the question 
whether liability for defective products should be imposed by the 
courts as a form of tort liability or instead be determined by contract 
(notably, through the use of waivers or warranties).  Some contributors 
to this literature argue that consumers tend to have better information 
than the courts about product characteristics, their own aversion to 
risk, and other factors bearing on the optimal form of liability.  These 
writers conclude, therefore, that consumers are better off if they are al-
lowed to choose the form of liability through contract.  Scholars who 
develop this theme include Professors Richard Epstein, George Priest, 
Paul Rubin, and Alan Schwartz.201  Conversely, other writers believe 
that courts generally have superior information about the need for 
product liability, in which case consumers are better off if liability is 
chosen by the courts.  Scholars who elaborate this view include Profes-
sors Steven Croley, Jon Hanson, William Landes, and Kip Viscusi, and 
Judge Posner.202  Hence, the major issue addressed by the contributors 
to this branch of the literature on product liability is whether such lia-
bility should be selected by the parties or by the courts, not whether 
product liability is socially desirable. 
Also of note is the economically oriented writing of Judge Calabre-
si, who introduced the notion that tort liability should be imposed on 
the cheapest cost avoider — the party who can reduce accident costs 
most effectively.203  According to Judge Calabresi, this principle im-
plies that manufacturers should be strictly liable for injuries to their 
customers when the manufacturers are better able to assess and con-
trol the risks of an accident.204  However, he does not develop the 
point that strict liability would not be needed to induce manufacturers 
to control accident risks to the degree that market forces already ac- 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  201  See R ICHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  MODERN  PRODUCTS  LIABILITY  LAW ( 1980); PAUL  H. 
RUBIN,  TORT  REFORM  BY  CONTRACT  (1993); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer 
Product Warranty, 90 Y ALE  L.J. 1297 ( 1981); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability 
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Y ALE L.J. 353 (1988).  But see Abraham L. Wickelgren, The 
Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
168, 168–69 (2006) (arguing that court-imposed liability is needed even when consumers correctly 
judge a product’s risk). 
  202  See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1991); Croley & Hanson, supra 
note 161; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products 
Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985). 
  203  See generally CALABRESI, supra note 7; Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test 
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). 
  204  Thus, for example, a manufacturer of a motorized lawnmower should be strictly liable for 
accidents caused by a defective blade breaking off and striking the owner.  Conversely, the owner 
of the lawnmower should bear her own losses if she drives it on a road and has an accident.  See 
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 203, at 1063–64.    
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complish this task,205 and he omits mention of regulation as an alter-
native.  In addition, Judge Calabresi does not attempt to determine 
whether the costs of the product liability system outweigh its safety 
and compensation benefits.206 
Hence, although there is a substantial body of writing about the 
economics of product liability, essentially no one attempts to assess its 
benefits and costs.207  As we explained, the focus tends to be on the 
theoretical effects of product liability under different assumptions 
about consumer information, on the question of whether product lia-
bility should be chosen by the parties or by the courts, and on the con-
cept of the cheapest cost avoider.208 
C.  Public Commentary 
Many newspapers, television networks, and policy-oriented organi-
zations favor product liability or report the views of others who do so.  
The main reasons given are essentially those provided by the courts 
and traditional academic writers.  First, they observe that product lia-
bility promotes fairness.  For example, an op-ed in the Washington 
Post stated that product liability is necessary “to ensure justice for vic-
tims”209 and the New York Times claimed that it is needed in order to 
“punish the makers and sellers of unsafe products.”210  A second justi-
fication they furnish is that product liability encourages product safety.   
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  205  He observes only that bargaining between a buyer and a seller could render liability irrele-
vant.  See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 162. 
  206  In Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 203, the compensatory benefits and the costs of the 
product liability system are not discussed.  In Judge Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents, there is a 
qualitative discussion of the benefits and costs of the tort system in general, but not of the benefits 
and costs of the product liability system in particular.  For his limited discussion of product liabili-
ty, see CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 161–73. 
  207  However, some scholars employ benefit-cost analysis to study related questions.  See 
DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 66, at 188–214 (focusing on a comparison of strict 
product liability to negligence-based liability with respect to the goals of deterrence, compensa-
tion, and corrective justice); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. 
L. REV. 555, 559–603 (1985) (analyzing the limited deterrence and compensation benefits of tort 
law generally). 
  208  Although these have been the major topics addressed in the economic literature on product 
liability, other issues have been studied as well.  See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products 
Liability Be Based on Hindsight?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1998); James Boyd & Daniel E. 
Ingberman, Should “Relative Safety” Be a Test of Product Liability?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 
(1997); Paul Burrows, Consumer Safety Under Products Liability and Duty To Disclose, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 457 (1992); Bruce Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Manufacturer Liability for Harms 
Caused by Consumers to Others, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1700 (2005); Janusz A. Ordover, Products 
Liability in Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 505 (1979). 
  209  Jan Schlichtmann, Op-Ed., Lawsuits: The People’s Last Resort, WASH. POST, July 10, 1999, 
at A17. 
  210  Editorial, Another Damaging Damages Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1998, at A14.    
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A USA Today article, for instance, stated that product liability lawsuits 
provide an incentive for firms to make safer products,211 and an NBC 
News story reported that a judgment against tobacco companies sent 
“a strong message” not to sell dangerous products.212  A third basis 
they offer for product liability is that it compensates injured consum-
ers.  For example, the president of Public Citizen testified that “prod-
uct liability litigation compensates injured people and shattered fami-
lies for unspeakable losses.”213 
There is, however, significant criticism of the product liability sys-
tem by the business press and conservative think tanks.  For instance, 
a Wall Street Journal editorial concluded that there have been “thou-
sands of small businesses driven under by  .  .  .  one product-liability 
case.”214  An American Enterprise Institute report stated that 
“[p]roducts liability has become a means of transferring wealth from 
the guilty and innocent alike to attorneys’ and random plaintiffs’ 
pockets” and that “[t]his does not deter design defects — it just deters 
design.”215  The theme of these writings is that product liability is hap-
hazard in its application, raises prices, inhibits innovation, causes de-
sirable products to be withdrawn from the marketplace, and drives   
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  211  Joan Biskupic, Court Draws Line on State Safeguards, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2008, at 3A. 
  212  NBC Nightly News: Reactions Over Record-High Judgment Against Tobacco Companies 
(NBC television broadcast July 15,  2000) (quoting the jury foreman in the case); see also 
MEGHAN  MULLIGAN  &  EMILY  GOTTLIEB, CTR.  FOR  JUSTICE  &  DEMOCRACY, 
LIFESAVERS:  CJ&D’S  GUIDE  TO  LAWSUITS  THAT  PROTECT  US  ALL ( 2001),  available at 
http://www.centerjd.org/archives/studies/Lifesavers.pdf (arguing that lawsuits concerning danger-
ous products make society safer by deterring negligent behavior); Dennis A. Henigan, Op-Ed., 
Sue The Gun Makers, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1999, at A31 (“The threat of product liability litiga-
tion is the only incentive gun makers have to improve the safety of their products.”); Bob Herbert, 
Op-Ed., Contract On the Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, § 1, at 19 (arguing that product 
liability lawsuits have a “deterrent effect”); Robert J. Samuelson, Op-Ed., Lawyer Heaven, WASH. 
POST, June 22, 1994, at A21 (noting that product liability law “deters dangerous products”); CBS 
This Morning: Number of Lawsuits Based on Product Liability Law Rising  (CBS television 
broadcast Oct. 23, 1995) (reporting the position that without the threat of large damage awards, 
there is no reason for companies to make their products safer or take unsafe products off the  
market). 
  213  Product Liability Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 122 
(1997) (statement of Joan Claybrook, President of Public Citizen); see also, e.g., NPR Morning 
Edition: Fertilizer Company Sued Following Oklahoma City Blast (NPR radio broadcast May 19, 
1995) (reporting that Rich Vernit of Citizen Action argued against product liability reform because 
it would undermine the full compensation of victims). 
  214  See Opinion, Review & Outlook: Lawyers Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at 
A14. 
  215  TED  FRANK, AM.  ENTER.  INST.  FOR  PUB.  POL’Y  RES.,  ROLLOVER  ECONOMICS: 
ARBITRARY  AND  CAPRICIOUS  PRODUCT  LIABILITY  REGIMES  6 ( 2007),  available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070104_LiabilityOutlookPosted_g.pdf.    
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companies out of business.216  The usual recommendation is that 
product liability be reformed in ways that reduce its scope.217 
The foregoing public commentary on product liability, like the cor-
responding discussion by the courts and traditional academic writers, 
is incompletely developed and supported.  The proponents of product 
liability rarely provide meaningful justification for the view that it will 
improve safety or for the belief that it is a desirable method of com-
pensation.218  Moreover, they typically ignore the costs of the product 
liability system.219  Similarly, most of the critics of product liability fail 
to supply evidence that product liability does not lead to greater safety 
or better compensation.220  Instead, they stress that product liability 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  216  See, e.g., MILTON  R.  COPULOS,  THE  HERITAGE  FOUND.,  AN  ℞ FOR  THE  PRODUCT 
LIABILITY  EPIDEMIC  1  (1985),  available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/ 
handle/10207/9205/87452_1.pdf?sequence=1 (claiming that the large number of product liabil-
ity cases is “threatening the very existence of some industries”); Editorial, Overload, WASH. POST, 
May 8, 1995, at A20 (arguing that reform of product liability law is needed because “the present 
system is so arbitrary and unfair”); Opinion, Review & Outlook: Litigation Liberalism, WALL ST. 
J., May 12, 1992, at A24 (stating that the risk of product liability lawsuits retards product innova-
tion); Samuelson, supra note 212 (noting that high liability costs are one reason that light aircraft 
production has declined from 13,000 to less than 1000 units annually); The Saturday Early Show: 
Warning Labels Placed on Products (CBS television broadcast Jan. 29, 2000) (observing that when 
companies lose product liability lawsuits, “the cost is mostly passed on to consumers . . . to the 
tune of more than $152 billion in . . . higher prices”); see also Scott Gottlieb, Articles & Commen-
tary: More Drugs Will Mean More Lawsuits, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., Feb. 26, 
2003, http://www.aei.org/article/16108 (arguing that product liability in the pharmaceutical indus-
try raises prices and limits innovation); Stephen B. Presser, How Should the Law of Products Lia-
bility Be Harmonized?: What Americans Can Learn from Europeans, GLOBAL  LIABILITY 
ISSUES, Feb. 2002, at 3, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/gli_2.pdf (observing that product 
liability is random in its application and raises product prices). 
  217  See, e.g., COPULOS, supra note 216 (proposing a list of reforms, including a statute of re-
pose, a limitation on contingent fees, and restrictions on awards for noneconomic losses); FRANK, 
supra note 215 (advocating a cap on noneconomic damages and more objective safety standards); 
Opinion, Review & Outlook: Guns and Poses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2003, at A12 (arguing that 
Congress should pass legislation that would limit lawsuits against the firearms industry); Editori-
al, Review & Outlook: The Trials of Merck, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2004, at A18 (arguing that FDA 
approval of a drug should insulate its manufacturer from product liability); Samuelson, supra note 
212 (suggesting that making the losing side pay legal fees would be a “genuine remedy” for many 
of the problems associated with product liability litigation); Editorial, Trial Lawyers’ Triumph, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1996, at A16 (endorsing legislation that would impose caps on punitive 
damages in product liability lawsuits); Presser, supra note 216 (recommending such changes as the 
abolition of contingent fees and punitive damages, and the adoption of the loser-pays rule regard-
ing legal fees). 
  218  The articles and broadcasts cited supra notes 209–13 either fail to provide justification or 
give only superficial justification.  For example, Samuelson asserts that product liability will im-
prove safety, but the effects of market forces and regulation on product safety are ignored.  See 
Samuelson, supra note 212.  Similarly, Herbert claims that product liability will lead to desirable 
compensation, but the fact that insurance already provides significant compensation to accident 
victims is overlooked.  See Herbert, supra note 212. 
  219  This is true of most of the sources cited supra notes 209–13. 
  220  None of the sources cited supra notes 214–17 provides evidence to support the claim that 
the deterrent effect of product liability is small.  However, one does take into account the signifi-
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raises product prices and causes firms to withdraw products from the 
market, though they do not recognize that these consequences are so-
cially undesirable only if the litigation cost–related component of the 
price increase is sufficiently high.221 
VIII.  THE CONTRAST BETWEEN PRODUCT LIABILITY AND 
LIABILITY TO STRANGERS 
For the purposes of our analysis, product liability should be distin-
guished from the liability of firms for harms caused to parties who are 
not their customers — that is, to “strangers.”222  Such victims include, 
for example, pedestrians struck by delivery trucks, tourists prevented 
from using a beach because of an oil spill, and bystanders hurt by the 
collapse of a crane at a construction project. 
There is a crucial difference between situations in which strangers 
are harmed and those in which customers are harmed: if strangers are 
injured by a firm, the firm would not expect to lose sales as a result, 
whereas if its customers are injured, it would expect to suffer such 
losses, as we have stressed.223  A pizza parlor would not be likely to 
experience diminished demand for its pizzas if its delivery vehicles hit 
pedestrians, but it would lose business if its pizzas caused food poison-
ing of its customers.224  The important implication of these observa-
tions is that market forces will not induce firms to increase safety if 
those at risk are strangers. 
A related point concerns price-signaling.  As we explained in Part 
III, when the victims of product accidents are customers, price in-
creases due to liability will not improve customers’ purchase decisions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cance of insurance as a source of compensation, see Presser, supra note 216, and some observe 
that litigation costs reduce the amount of money that victims obtain, see, e.g., Review & Outlook: 
Litigation Liberalism, supra note 216. 
  221  None of the sources cited supra notes 214–17  discusses the litigation cost–related price   
distortion. 
  222  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 cmt. 
f, illus. 1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing an example in which a power company is 
made liable to a stranger — the company strung a power line across a river that came into contact 
with the mast of the plaintiff’s sailboat and caused severe electrical burns); see also DOBBS, supra 
note 1, § 227, at 578 (“Among strangers — those who are in no special relationship that may affect 
duties owed — the default rule is that everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to others to avoid 
physical harms.”). 
  223  The discussion in this Part is based on ideas developed in Shavell, supra note 92.   
  224  Similarly, an oil company probably would not lose sales if one of its tankers caused an oil 
spill, but it would expect to suffer a reduction in demand if its gasoline damaged automobile en-
gines.  In the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the most serious environmental accident in North 
American history, Exxon’s revenue actually rose in the quarter after the spill.  Exxon reported 
$22.2 billion in revenue in the first quarter of 1989, the quarter during which the spill occurred, 
and $23.6 billion in revenue in the second quarter of 1989.  Exxon Corp.: Interim Consol. Earns.: 
June ‘89, STANDARD & POOR’S DAILY NEWS, July 24, 1999, available at 1989 WLNR 267918.    
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to the extent that they are well-informed about product risks.225  
Higher pizza prices will not be needed to discourage consumption of 
pizza if consumers know about a substantial risk of food poisoning.  
But when the victims of product accidents are strangers, price increas-
es due to liability will be needed because the customers of those prod-
ucts will otherwise ignore the injuries to strangers caused by their pur-
chases.  Higher pizza prices, reflecting accident costs, are required to 
discourage consumers from buying pizza from sellers whose delivery 
vehicles cause harm to pedestrians.  In sum, the price-signaling benefit 
of liability is generally greater when the victims of product accidents 
are strangers than when they are customers.226 
Both because of the ineffectiveness of market forces in creating 
safety and because of the need for product prices to reflect risk when 
victims are strangers, the rationale for liability is stronger in that case 
than when victims are customers. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
We have explained in this Article that when product liability is 
viewed in terms of its benefits and costs, there are reasons for ques-
tioning its desirability, at least for many widely sold products.  The 
main bases for our conclusion are as follows.  First, market forces and 
regulation frequently reduce the need for product liability to encourage 
safety, especially for products sold in high volume.  Moreover, the 
available empirical evidence suggests that the safety benefit of product 
liability for widely sold products is often small.  Second, the price-
signaling benefit of product liability is limited and is likely to be large-
ly, if not entirely, offset by the price distortions caused by litigation 
costs and awards for nonmonetary losses.  Third, product liability does 
not promote the compensation goal nearly as much as might appear 
because this objective is already achieved to a significant extent 
through private and public insurance.  Furthermore, product liability 
tends to detract from the compensation goal because it provides 
awards for nonmonetary losses.  Finally, the product liability system 
generates high legal expenses, equaling or exceeding the payments re-
ceived by plaintiffs. 
If our assessment of product liability is accepted, it implies that se-
rious consideration should be given to curtailing such liability.  This 
could be accomplished through application of legal doctrines that 
make the imposition of product liability depend on several factors sug-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  225  See supra section III.A, pp. 1459–61.  
  226  The other components of a benefit-cost analysis of liability to strangers are essentially the 
same as those in our analysis of product liability.  In particular, regulation tends to improve safety, 
the compensation rationale for liability is weak, and the costs of the liability system are high.    
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gested by our analysis.  One is whether consumers are likely to know 
about a product’s risk.227  Another is whether the product is subject to 
significant safety regulation.228  We expect that appropriate considera-
tion of these two factors would, for reasons that we have explained, 
disfavor liability for harms caused by many widely sold products.  A 
third factor is the likelihood that the plaintiff has insurance coverage 
sufficient to compensate for the monetary losses sustained.229  Use of 
these factors would encourage the courts to reduce the scope of prod-
uct liability when such liability would be unlikely to significantly pro-
mote product safety or compensation, but still allow for the imposition 
of product liability when it would be advantageous.230 
Legislative change could also be contemplated that would limit or 
eliminate product liability in certain industries or for certain widely 
sold products.  Indeed, this has already been done, for example,   
for general aviation aircraft231 and vaccines.232  Restricting or abolish-
ing product liability might make sense for many more widely sold 
products. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  227  To some degree courts already take consumer knowledge into account in product liability 
decisions.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d (“The fact that a danger is 
open and obvious is relevant to the issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a 
plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable alternative design should have been adopted that 
would have reduced or prevented injury to the plaintiff.”). 
  228  Courts also currently consider regulation as a factor in product liability cases.  See, e.g., id. 
§ 4(b) (“[A] product’s compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regu-
lation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect to the 
risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as 
a matter of law a finding of product defect.”). 
  229  We are not aware of any legal doctrine that would allow the liability of a defendant to de-
pend on the likelihood that the plaintiff has insurance coverage. 
  230  In an article on which we are at work, we develop these factors and explain how they could 
be employed by the courts. 
  231  See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, § 2(a) 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 notes (2006)) (“[N]o civil action for damages for death or injury to 
persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may 
be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, 
system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident 
occurred [after an applicable limitation period of 18 years].”). 
  232  See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 
Stat. 3755, 3773 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (2006)) (“No vaccine manufacturer shall be 
liable in a civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with 
the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death resulted from side ef-
fects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompa-
nied by proper directions and warnings.”). 